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This dissertation is an empirical study of demand and supply in differ-
entiated products markets using supermarket scanner data on two particular
product categories - canned tuna and hot-breakfast cereals. First, I study
the impact of retailers’ price promotions on consumer demand and retailer
profits in the canned-tuna product category. Since canned tuna is storable, I
examine whether consumers stock up during sales. The results suggest that
only a limited amount of stockpiling exists in this product category. Since
inventory is not very important, consumer demand is thus modeled by a static
demand model with a random-coefficients-nested-logit specification, which is
estimated by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method. The unit-sales decom-
position results show that on average 36% of the demand response to price
promotions comes from brand-switching, so market expansion effects due to
consumers switching from the outside good and to higher quantities usually
dominate the brand-switching effect. Using the demand estimates, I compute
v
optimal retail prices assuming that stores are local monopolists and choose
prices to maximize static category-level profits. I find that regular prices at
”high-low” stores are typically at or slightly below the optimal prices, but that
regular prices at ”every-day-low-price” stores are substantially below the opti-
mal prices. These results suggest that retail price levels and price promotions
are more likely related to local market conditions such as retail competition.
In addition, I study the effects of store-brand (SB) entry on the demand
elasticities of incumbent national brands (NB), consumers’ substitution pat-
terns for national and store brands, and the implications for consumer welfare
in the hot-breakfast-cereals product category. A random-coefficients model
of consumer demand is estimated by the generalized-method-of-moments ap-
proach. The empirical findings are: (1) After the entry of SB’s, demand
becomes more elastic for non-imitated NB’s, and either more elastic or shows
no change for imitated NB’s; (2) in general, substitution patterns for NB’s and
SB’s are asymmetric, i.e., when the prices of their favorite products increase,
most NB buyers tend to substitute to other NB products, but SB buyers will
substitute to the corresponding imitated NB’s; (3) the increase in consumer
surplus due to SB entry is trivial for an individual consumer, but the aggregate
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An Empirical Study of Price Promotions: The
Case of Canned Tuna
1.1 Introduction
Why do retailers hold sales, and why do they hold them at particular
times and frequencies? The aim of this chapter is to study these questions
in the context of supermarket retailing of a particular product - canned tuna.
As with many or most goods sold at supermarkets, this product is frequently
observed to be on price promotion (“on sale”). In the data used below, defining
a sale to be a temporary discount of at least 20% off the normal price, I find
that most supermarkets had at least one brand of tuna on sale in at least
half the weeks over a sample period of several years. Since the frequencies
and magnitudes of sales for a particular product can have a major impact on
revenues, it is of interest to study the role of these sale characteristics in the
store’s overall profit maximization problem.
My empirical approach is to first estimate a static model of individual
consumer demand using scanner data on household purchases. Consumers’
simultaneous choices of brand and quantity are modeled using a random-
coefficients-nested-logit approach. The data come from the ERIM data set,
which contains household purchases of grocery products in Springfield, MO,
over 123 weeks from 1985 to 1987. Using these data I estimate a demand model
by the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, which is computationally much
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faster than likelihood methods and which permits recovery of both population-
level and individual-level parameters.
I then use the demand estimates to perform two kinds of counterfactual
experiments. In the first I estimate the sources of the boost in sales quantities
during price-promotion periods. That is, following a stream of related research
in the marketing literature, I ask how much of a sales boost (or “bump”) comes
from: (a) consumers switching from other product categories or no consump-
tion (the “outside good”); (b) consumers switching from other brands in the
same category; and (c) increased quantities purchased by existing consumers
of the brand. This decomposition is of interest because the relative magnitudes
of these components tells us something about the implied profitability of the
price promotion from the respective points of view of retailers and manufactur-
ers. If most of the sales bump comes from consumers in category (b), then the
promotion is apparently benefiting a particular manufacturer more than the
retailer, since the former realizes increased quantities at the expense of a rival
brand, whereas the latter just observes a shift in sales from one inventory item
to another (and that other item may be sold at a lower price). (In other words,
behavior of type (b) represents “cannibalization” from the retailer’s point of
view.) To the extent that the promotion does not reduce its sales of goods
in other categories, the retailer may do better when consumers of types (a)
and (c) are relatively more important, since those types represent purchases
of tuna that would not have been made in the absence of the promotion.
While the above decomposition exercise provides indirect evidence about
the retailer’s profitability of sales, in my second counterfactual exercise I in-
vestigate this profitability directly, using estimates of retailer marginal costs.
The ERIM data do not contain wholesale prices, so I derive these marginal-
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cost estimates from the well-known Dominick’s supermarket scanner database.
Under plausible assumptions the average acquisition costs from Dominick’s can
be used as proxies for the missing costs in the ERIM data. Given these esti-
mated wholesale prices and the results of my demand estimation I calculate
optimal retail prices for each store in the data, assuming that a store is a local
monopolist who chooses prices each week to maximize static profits. I then
compare these predicted optimal prices with those actually observed in the
data, both during and outside of sale periods.
With respect to my results on the decomposition of a sales bump, I
find that the composition varies considerably depending upon the brand on
promotion and upon the magnitude of price discount. In general, however, the
ordering of the magnitudes of the three effects is, from highest to lowest, pur-
chase incidence (i.e., switching from the outside good), brand switching, and
purchase quantity. On average, across brands and discount depths, the increase
due to brand switching is only about 36%, so market-expansion effects usu-
ally dominate the business-stealing effect. In particular, price promotions are
effective in inducing purchases of canned tuna from previous non-purchasers.
Using the demand estimates, I then back out wholesale prices and run a coun-
terfactual experiment to study retailer pass-through of a manufacturer’s trade
deal (i.e., a temporary reduction in wholesale price). The result of this ex-
periment suggests that retailer pass-through exceeds 100%. This finding is
not necessarily inconsistent with profit maximization by the retailer. For ex-
ample, monopoly pass-through is more than 100% if the demand function is
log-convex (Amir, 2005).
There is an extensive marketing literature on estimation of consumer
choice models using scanner data. Most of these studies find that brand switch-
3
ing plays a significantly more important role than in my study. Gupta’s (1988)
decomposition of the total price elasticity for regular ground coffee attributes
84% to brand switching. Chiang (1991) obtains similar results using a different
choice model which treats the decisions of whether, what, and how much to buy
simultaneously rather than independently. Both studies account for observed,
but not unobserved, consumer characteristics. Chintagunta (1993) estimates
a random-effects-discrete-choice model using panel data on yogurt purchases
and obtains an elasticity decomposition in which 40% is due to brand switch-
ing, 15% is due to higher incidence, and 45% is due to switches to higher
quantities. Bucklin, Gupta, and Siddarth (1998) also study the market for
yogurt using a different approach to account for unobserved consumer hetero-
geneity and find that the percentages for the three effects are 58%, 20%, and
22% respectively. Bell, Chiang and Padmanabhan (1999) report price elas-
ticity decompositions for 173 brands across 13 different product categories.
They find that, on average, 75% of the elasticity is due to brand-switching,
11% to purchase incidence, and 14% to purchase quantity. However, Heerde,
Gupta, and Wittink (2003) have recently pointed out that the way in which
these studies measure the brand-switching effect is misleading and propose a
complementary decomposition measure based on unit sales.1 When they ap-
ply this measure to the same data used in Bell et al (1999), they find that
brand switching accounts for only 33% of a sales bump. I adopt this unit sales
1In the elasticity-based decomposition, the brand-switching effect is measured as the
change in brand choice probability conditional on purchase probability. In the unit-sales
based decomposition, it is measured as the ratio of decreased sales of the non-promoted
brands to increased sales of the promoted brand. The former measures the gross change in
sales for non-promoted brands holding category volume constant whereas the latter measures
the net change in sales of non-promoted brands, which takes into account the increase in
category volume due to higher purchase probabilities.
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approach for my decomposition exercise.
When I introduce wholesale prices from the Dominick’s data into my
analysis, one feature in particular stands out. Most price promotions are driven
by the retailer, not the manufacturers. This is apparent from the considerable
heterogeneity across stores in the frequency of price promotions. Some stores
have frequent sales whereas others do not. The literature refers to the former
as “high-low” stores and the latter as “everyday-low-price” stores. Using my
demand estimates, I perform a counterfactual experiment in which I compare
the observed price-cost margins with those that would be notionally optimal
given the wholesale prices in the data. I find that regular brand prices at the
“high-low” stores are typically at or below the optimal prices. By contrast,
regular brand prices at the “everyday-low-price” stores are substantially below
the optimal prices.
The immediate implication of these findings is that retailers seem to
incur losses from their price promotions. Why then hold sales at all? The ten-
dency of my model to over-predict retail markups and the variation in markups
across stores suggest that retail price levels and price promotions reflect local
competition among stores for customers who find shopping at different stores
costly. Therefore, in a sense, Varian’s (1980) theory of sales may have some rel-
evance in explaining the existence of retailer price promotions: supermarkets
use sales to compete for informed consumers (i.e., consumers who read super-
market flyers advertising products on sale). However, since stores sell many
products and consumers usually choose stores based on the prices of multiple
products in their shopping baskets, not just the price of one single item, incor-
porating retail competition into the current model is not straightforward and
is not dealt with in this study.
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There are several other theories of sales in the literature, but none ap-
pear to fit the present context well. Sobel (1984) develops an inter-temporal
model of price discrimination in which a monopolist holds a sale from time
to time in order to sell to low-valuation consumers who accumulate during
periods of high prices. In his model, the product is a consumer durable and
new consumers enter the market each period; neither feature characterizes the
market for canned tuna. Aguirregabiria (1999) assumes that retailers stockpile
products due to fixed costs of ordering and sales are needed to reduce heavy
inventories. I lack data on inventories but the variation in sales across brands,
stores, and time do not appear to be driven by inventory costs. Hendel and
Nevo (2002, 2005) develop a demand model of consumer inventory holding and
derive several implications for the observed data when stockpiling behavior is
present.2 Since canned tuna is a storable good, I initially considered their
dynamic model of demand. Before estimating this model, however, I checked
to see whether the data are consistent with the reduced-form predictions of
Hendel and Nevo’s model (2002). The results suggest that consumer stockpil-
ing is not very important for this product category (see Chapter 3 for details).
This is not too surprising, since most purchases of canned tuna consist of one
or two cans.
I also consider other dynamic aspects of consumer behavior which might
be thought to drive sellers’ observed choices of sale depth and frequency. A
2Hong, McAfee, and Nayyar (2002) consider a model of price dispersion for a storable
good, where price-sensitive consumers not only buy from the cheapest store, but can keep
up to one unit in inventory, and sales are used to price discriminate between consumers with
high and low search and storage costs. Anton and Das Varma (2005) consider a two-period
Cournot model also for a storable good where they find that there exists an equilibrium
such that prices are lower in the first period because firms have an incentive to steal rivals’
demand from the future.
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recent paper by Hartmann (2006) estimates a model of demand in which a
store’s customers have preferences for “spacing” in consumption. When I
allow for such an effect in my demand estimates it turns out to be statistically
significant, but very small in magnitude, too small to be a driving factor in
sales patterns. Similarly, when I allow for a time-varying brand loyalty effect
the estimated coefficient is small, negative, and insignificant. In summary,
inter-temporal demand effects do not seem to explain the occurrence of sales
in the data under examination here.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes
the data. The econometric model of demand is presented in Section 1.3 and
the estimation procedure is described in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 reports the
estimation results. Section 1.6 presents the estimated price elasticities and pro-
vides a unit-sales-based decomposition. Section 1.7 uses the demand estimates
to compute retailer markups and pass-through rates. Section 1.8 investigates
the profitability of retailer price promotions. Section 1.9 concludes.
1.2 Data
The consumer data I am using come from the ERIM data set pro-
vided by the James M. Kilts Center, GSB, University of Chicago. The ERIM
data set was collected by the now-defunct ERIM division of A.C. Nielsen.
It contains household-level purchase data for 9 packaged-good product cate-
gories in two mid-sized mid-western cities, Sioux Falls, SD and Springfield,
MO, which are demographically typical of the U.S. population as a whole.
Households who participated in the ERIM study were issued with magnetic
ID cards. When they presented their ID cards at the checkout counters in
the participating stores, their purchases of any UPC’s in those 9 product cat-
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egories were recorded. The total sales of the participating stores accounted
for 80% of the market in terms of grocery and drug retail sales. Each record
in the household-level data is a purchase occasion which records who made
the purchase (household id), when (week) and where (store) the purchase oc-
curred, the UPC and quantity being purchased, and the total payment made
for the purchase. Moreover, when households joined the ERIM study, they
were asked to fill out a questionnaire, which made available some basic demo-
graphics about the households. I use two demographic variables, household
income and household size, to account for observed consumer heterogeneity in
the model.
The demand model is estimated using purchase data for canned tuna
in the city of Springfield, MO. The data consist of 58,920 purchase occasions
of 5,255 households at 21 participating stores associated with 4 different su-
permarket chains. The sample period is from January 1985 to May 1987 (123
weeks). There are 5 package sizes in the canned-tuna product category: 3.25
oz, 6.5 oz, 9.25 oz, 12.5 oz, and 3-pack-3.25 oz. Table 1.1 presents the market
share, purchase occasion share, and non-price promotion (i.e., feature adver-
tisements or in-store displays) share of each package size. It shows that the
6.5 oz package size is the dominant one in terms of both store sales (89.6%)
and household purchases (91.4%). Furthermore, Table 1.2 indicates that a
handful of UPC’s account for the majority of sales in this product category.
They are 6.5-oz light tuna in water/oil of StarKist, Chicken of the Sea (CKN),
Three Diamond, and private label (PL). The table shows the market, purchase-
occasion, and non-price promotion shares, and average shelf prices of these 4
brands. They have a collective market share of more than 79% and account
for at least 81% of the households’ purchase occasions and 95% of the partic-
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ipating stores’ non-price promotions. I only consider these top-selling UPC’s
in the demand estimation due to their dominance in this product category.
Therefore, the number of consumers’ brand choices in the demand model is
limited to 4.
In the demand model, the alternatives in the choice set are the combina-
tions of brands and units. To keep the model tractable, I limit the maximum
quantity chosen to 4. It is not a very strong restriction since in 98.1% of
the purchase occasions households purchased no more than 4 units of canned
tuna. Moreover, when I define a sale as a price discount of at least 20% off
the modal price, the percentage of sale purchase occasions such that the panel
households purchased no more than 4 cans stays high (97.8%). Under these
restrictions on brand choices and quantity choices, the households remaining
in the sample are those who only purchased the stated brands and quantities,
who had at least two purchase occasions, and whose demographic information
is not missing. This selection leaves me 511 households and 5,143 purchase
occasions.
In addition to the 16 “inside goods” (the combinations of 4 brand
choices and 4 quantity choices), there is another alternative in the choice
set, the “outside good”, which represents the no-purchase occasion (of canned
tuna) conditional on a store visit. Note that the no-purchase occasion is not
directly observed in the data. To solve this problem, I construct a history
of store visits for each household in the sample by collecting their purchase
occasions in the 9 product categories in the ERIM data set. I then derive the
no-purchase occasions for each household by comparing their store visit histo-
ries to their canned-tuna purchase histories. The drawback of this approach is
that since the ERIM data set contains purchases in only 9 product categories,
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I cannot count those store visits where the household did not purchase any of
the UPC’s in those 9 product categories. An alternative way to derive the no-
purchase occasions is to assume that a household visits a store every week, and
for those weeks where store-visit data are missing, I can then assume that the
household visited the store which appears most frequently in the “observed”
store-visit history. The drawback of this approach is that even if a household
does go grocery shopping weekly, for those inferred no-purchase occasions, the
price and advertising information used to compute the choice probability in
the likelihood function may not represent the true values of the data. I adopt
the first approach and find 30,185 no-purchase occasions.
Retail prices of the 4 brands studied, particularly StarKist and CKN,
exhibit a certain pattern over time: the prices remain constant at a “regular
price” for a longer period of time and drop occasionally to a “sale price” for a
shorter period. I find that prices are highly correlated across stores in the same
chain. Therefore, I picked one store from each of the 4 supermarket chains in
the data and graphed the weekly retail prices of StarKist and CKN in these
4 stores over the sample period, as shown in Figures 1.1 to 1.4. Even though
we can easily observe the kind of price patterns just described, it is harder to
pinpoint what the regular and sale prices are. I follow one approach in Hendel
and Nevo (2002), by which regular price is defined as the modal price over the
sample period. I then define a brand to be on sale if its shelf price is at least a
certain percentage below its regular price. Table 1.3 presents the frequencies
of sales of the 4 brands in each chain. It shows that frequencies of sales differ
across brands within a chain. StarKist and CKN are promoted more often
than the other two brands by the retailers. Moreover, frequencies of sales vary
across chains within a brand. In addition, as illustrated in Figures 1.5 and 1.6,
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it seems that the timing and the magnitude of sales within a brand are not
synchronized across chains. Another finding about these price promotions is
that retailers seem to prefer to stagger sales of different brands across different
weeks, rather than having more than one brand on sale simultaneously. Table
1.4 shows that in general, given a sale week, it is more likely that only one
brand is on sale.
1.3 Demand Model
Consumers’ purchase decisions on whether to buy (purchase incidence),
what to buy (brand choice), and how much to buy (quantity choice) are mod-
eled jointly using a nested logit model. Let i denote consumer (i = 1, . . . , N),
j denote brand choice (j = 1, . . . , J), x denote quantity choice (x = 1, . . . , X),
and t denote time of a store visit (Ti is the total number of store visits by
consumer i). Given that consumer i visits a store at week t, the consumer
problem is to choose one of the alternatives in the choice set {0, jx;∀j∀x}
(where 0 denotes the choice of outside good and jx denotes the choice of x
units of brand j) to maximize utility. The utility derived from the outside
good is
ui0t = γi0 + βi1Hit + βi2H
2
it + ζi0t + ρiεi0t (1.1)
The utility derived from the inside good jx is
uijxt = γijx
αi + γiP Pjtx + γiAAjt + ζixt + ρiεijxt, (1.2)
for j = 1, . . ., J, x = 1, . . . , X
Here γi0 and γij’s are consumer i’s taste preferences on the outside good and
on the brands of inside goods. αi is a measure of how fast marginal utility
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decreases with respect to quantity consumed and is constrained to 0 < αi 6 1.
Hit is the elapsed time since last consumption (i.e., the interval between con-
sumer i’s last purchase occasion and the current shopping occasion, measured
in weeks), and βi1 and βi2 are the parameters that determine how consumer
i’s utility is affected by Hit. Pjt is the price of brand j at week t, and γiP
is consumer i’s marginal utility of income. Ajt is a dummy variable which
is 1 if brand j is on feature/display advertising at week t and 0 otherwise,
and γiA measures consumer i’s response to advertising. ζigt(g = 0, 1, . . . , X,
X=4) is an unobserved shock common to every alternative in the group g.
εikt, k ∈ {0, jx, ∀j∀x} is another unobserved shock assumed identically and
independently distributed extreme value. The distribution of ζigt is the unique
distribution with the property such that if εikt is an extreme value random vari-
able, the total unobserved utility, ζigt +ρiεikt, is also an extreme value random
variable. Finally, ρi measures the degree of independence in unobserved utility
among the alternatives within a group. It is assumed to be individual-specific
but the same across groups and its value is constrained to 0 < ρi 6 1.
In the standard discrete-choice logit model, the error term is used to
account for the unobserved components of utility and is assumed to be i.i.d.
across alternatives and time. However, if the observed product characteristics
do not account for all the important aspects of the choice set, the unobserved
utilities of some alternatives may be correlated with each other due to some
unaccounted dimensions in the product characteristics space. I use brand
dummies as the observed product characteristics - these dummies are then
subsumed into the γij’s. To account for the possibility of unobserved shocks
to consumption quantities, I nest alternatives with the same quantity of dif-
ferent brands into the same group. This specification captures the possibility
12
that when a consumer has a high unobserved demand shock for the alterna-
tive, say, x units of brand j, his/her unobserved demand shocks for x units of
other brands may be high as well. A higher value of ρi means greater indepen-
dence and less correlation in the unobserved components of utility among the
alternatives within a nest. In the polar case such that ρi equals 1, the nested
logit model reduces to the standard logit model (Train, 2003, Chapter 4).
I assume that households do not stockpile so that a purchase occasion
coincides with a consumption occasion. At first glance, this assumption may
seem too strong to be applied to the canned-tuna product category. Since
canned food is storable, consumers can stock up when it is on sale. However,
storability is only a necessary condition for stockpiling. When a good is not a
necessity and has a low consumption frequency, price promotions of the good
may only prompt consumers to purchase for current consumption, rather than
to stockpile for future consumption since they may incur an inventory cost.
Chapter 3 examines whether consumer stockpile canned tuna during sales.
Using the same data set, I check whether the data are consistent with the
reduced-form predictions of Hendel and Nevo’s model of consumer inventory
holding (2002). The results suggest that only a limited amount of stockpiling is
present. Therefore, we need not to be too concerned about potential bias in the
price elasticities from the current static model with no consumer stockpiling.
When the product category under consideration is food and a non-
necessity, consumers’ purchase behavior may be influenced by the passage
of time. To account for this possibility, I allow a consumer’s utility from
the outside good to vary over time depending on the elapsed time since last
consumption (purchase). Therefore, the elapsed time since last consumption
only affects the probability of purchase, not the probability of brand-quantity
13
choice conditional on a purchase. If this variable has a positive impact on
the purchase probability for the outside good, then it suggests a model of
preferences in which desire for tuna declines over time, i.e. the longer the
time period without consuming canned tuna, the less likely a purchase will
be made. On the other hand, if the impact is negative, it suggests a model
of preferences in which desire for canned-tuna increases over time, i.e., utility
from consumption is increasing with respect to the time since last consumption
(Hartmann, 2006).
The problem of consumer utility maximization in the nested logit model
has a closed-form solution. First of all, the probability that consumer i chooses
the alternative of x units of brand j at week t is













αi + γiP Pjtx + γiAAjt − (γi0 + βi1Hit + βi2H2it),




exp(δijxt/ρi), for x = 1, . . . , X
The probability that consumer i chooses the outside good, i.e., no purchase of


















Finally, market demand for brand j can be computed by aggregating demand






xPrit(jx), for j = 1, . . . , J (1.5)
To account for consumer heterogeneity, all the parameters in the model
are individual-specific. However, since the length of the panel data is not long,
I assume that these individual-level parameters do not vary over time. Con-
sumer heterogeneity is modeled by a random-coefficients approach where het-
erogeneity is driven by observed consumer demographics and an unobserved
component, interpreted as unobserved consumer characteristics. I assume that
the distribution of individual-level parameters follows a conditional multivari-
ate normal with mean as a function of consumer demographics, i.e.,
θi = ΠDi + νi, (1.6)
where νi ∼ iidN(0, diag(Σθ)), for i = 1, . . . , N
Here θi is a k × 1 vector consisting of k individual-level parameters, i.e.,
θi = ({γij}Jj=1, γi0, γiP , γiA,βi1, βi2, α∗i , ρ∗i )′
Di is a d× 1 vector consisting of a constant and d− 1 demographic variables;
Π is a k×d coefficient matrix which measures how individual-level parameters
vary with demographics; Σθ is a k × 1 coefficient vector which determines
the dispersion of unobserved consumer characteristics. Rossi, McCulloch, and
Allenby (1996) suggest that the variability of individual-level parameters due
to unobserved rather than observable consumer heterogeneity can be measured
by comparing Σθ with the marginal variance of θi. Finally, because of the
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constraints on the values of αi and ρi, I define
αi =
exp(α∗i )
1 + exp(α∗i )
and ρi =
exp(ρ∗i )
1 + exp(ρ∗i )
.
That is, αi and ρi are transformations of normals and the constraints are
always satisfied.
Consumer demand is modeled by a discrete-choice-logit model where
the choice set consists of all combinations between the brand and quantity
choices. The reason for this approach is that in the data households usu-
ally purchase one or more units of only one brand on a given shopping trip.
However, if it is the case that consumers purchase multi-units as well as multi-
brands at the same time, other approaches will have to be employed to handle
such multiple discreteness. One example is the approach proposed by Hendel
(1999) and Dube (2005). Hendel studies the personal computer (PC) market,
and in his data, firms purchase multiple units of different brands of PCs. Dube
studies the carbonated soft drink (CSD) industry, and in his CSD purchase
data, multiple-item purchases occur frequently. In Hendel’s model, demand for
assortments results from the number of potential tasks each firm has that can
be performed by PC’s. In Dube’s model, the demand for assortments reflects
the number of potential consumption occasions a household expects before
the next shopping trip. The Hendel/Dube approach is to derive a purchase
demand system by aggregating over unobserved consumption occasions. It is
more powerful in the sense that it is able to deal with multiple discreteness.
However, since households typically purchase only one brand at each shopping
trip in my data, their model does not fit the data here better than the logit
model. That is, the main difference between my data and standard single-unit
purchase data is in multiple-unit purchases of a given brand, which I allow for
by treating quantity choices as the nests in my logit.
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1.4 Estimation Procedure
I estimate the model using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method, which is a simulated Bayesian method and is well-suited for mod-
els built from a sequence of conditional distributions (Rossi and Allenby,
2003). Compared to classical procedures such as maximum likelihood meth-
ods, Bayesian procedures do not require the maximization of any function.
Moreover, desirable estimation properties such as consistency and efficiency
can be attained under more relaxed conditions. However, since parameters
in the Bayesian procedures are represented by a posterior distribution which
reflects both prior beliefs and sample information, to derive relevant Bayesian
statistics requires an iterative process which takes draws from the posterior
and converges after a sufficient number of iterations. The problem is that in
practice it is not easy for researchers to determine when convergence has been
achieved. Therefore, even though Bayesian procedures circumvent the diffi-
culties of convergence to a maximum in the classical approaches, they have
their own convergence problems. However, the way to examine and interpret
an estimator derived by Bayesian procedures is no different from that in clas-
sic procedures. In fact, under certain conditions, the Bayesian estimator is
asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator. Therefore,
Train suggests that a researcher’s statistical perspective should not dictate
which estimation procedure to adopt. Instead, what the researcher should
consider is which type of convergence will be less burdensome regarding the
particular setting of her/his model (Train, 2003, Chapter 12).
Consumer heterogeneity is modeled by a random-coefficients approach
where heterogeneity is driven by observed household demographics and unob-
served components with a known distribution. Therefore, the demand model
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can be specified through a series of conditional distributions, also known as a
hierarchical model, which the MCMC method is especially suited to estimate
(Allenby and Rossi, 1999). Moreover, the MCMC method enables inference
not only about the common random-coefficients parameters, but also about the
individual-specific parameters. Note that any successful marketing analysis re-
quires a detailed understanding of the distribution of consumer heterogeneity.
However, when the preferences of the consumers targeted by marketers are
not well represented by the summary statistics describing the distribution of
heterogeneity for the entire market, the estimated responses obtained using
only the aggregate information can be biased. Under these circumstances, in-
ferences about the unit-level parameters enabled by the the MCMC method
become especially useful since the market-wide response can be derived by
aggregating over the individual household’s response to make the adjustments
for the distribution of heterogeneity (Rossi and Allenby, 1993).
Roughly speaking, the MCMC estimation method proceeds by specify-
ing a prior distribution for the parameters in the model and then repeatedly
taking draws from the posterior distribution conditional on the observed data,
which can be facilitated by Gibbs sampling and/or the Metropolis-Hasting
(MH) algorithm. Bayes theorem gives the following relation.
P (Ω|Y ) ∝ L(Y |Ω)P (Ω) (1.7)
Here Ω is the vector of model parameters, including the population-level pa-
rameters (Π and Σθ) and the individual-level parameters (θi’s). P (Ω) is the
prior distribution of Ω. Y is the set of observed choices made by independent
decision makers in the sample. L(Y |Ω) is the likelihood function of the ob-
served choices which depends on Ω. And P (Ω|Y ) is the posterior distribution
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of Ω, which is proportional to the prior distribution multiplied by the likelihood
function, reflecting both the prior beliefs and the sample information.
The hierarchical model in this application consists of the consumer-level
likelihood, L(yi|θi),∀i, the first-stage prior, φ(θi|Π, Σθ), ∀i, and the second-
stage prior, K(Π, Σθ|Λ). Since households’ choices are modeled by nested logit,
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Here φ(θi|Π, Σθ) denotes the normal density since the distribution on individual-
level parameters is specified as a conditional multivariate normal, i.e., θi ∼
N(ΠDi, Σθ), for i = 1, . . . , 511. K(Π, Σθ|Λ) is the prior on the population-
level parameters, Π and Σθ, and Λ is the parameters of the prior distribution.
I assume that the prior on Π (denoted by k(Π)) is normal with mean µ0 and
variance matrix σ20, i.e., Π ∼ N(µ0, σ20); the prior on Σθ (denoted by k(Σθ))
is inverted Wishart with ν0 degrees of freedom and a scale matrix s0, i.e.,
Σθ ∼ IW (ν0, s0); and the two priors are independent. Moreover, I use very
diffuse priors on Π and Σθ by setting
µ0 = 0, σ
2
0 = 100I, ν0 = dim(Σθ) + 1, and s0 = I.
The values of the prior parameters are chosen to make the two priors nearly
flat, i.e., all possible values of the parameters are considered equally likely.
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Therefore, the prior distributions represent very little knowledge about the
parameters before taking the sample and the sample information about each
household greatly influences the posterior.
The joint posterior distribution of the model parameter is described by
Equation (1.8).





Pr(yit|θi)φ(θi|Π, Σθ)× k(Π)k(Σθ) (1.8)
Taking draws from this posterior can be done by Gibbs sampling, which in-
volves breaking the model parameters into different blocks and successively
taking one draw in each block in turn, conditional on the values of the pa-
rameters in the other blocks. I break the model parameters into 3 blocks: the
first block contains the individual-level parameters, θi’s, the second and third
blocks contain the population-level parameters, Π and Σθ. I take draws of the
model parameters from the posterior through a three-step procedure described
as follows.
Step 1 : Take a draw of θi conditional on the values of Π and Σθ, for
each household in the sample. The conditional posterior distribution of θi is
P (θi|Π, Σθ, yi) ∝
Ti∏
t=1
Pr(yit|θi)× φ(θi|Π, Σθ), for i = 1, ..., 511
There is no simple way to draw from this conditional posterior because it
involves multinomial logits. Thus the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used
to take draws in this step.
Step 2 : Take a draw of Π conditional on the values of Σθ and θi’s. The
conditional posterior distribution of Π is





This conditional posterior follows a normal distribution. Thus taking draws
in this step is straightforward.
Step 3 : Take a draw of Σθ conditional on the values of Π and θi’s. The
conditional posterior distribution of Σθ is




This conditional posterior follows an inverted Wishart distribution. Thus tak-
ing draws in this step is also straightforward. Details on how draws are taken
from these conditional posteriors are provided in the appendix.
This three-step procedure is repeated to obtain a sequence of draws,
which after enough iterations converges to draws from the joint posterior of
the model parameters. The initial draws in the sequence prior to convergence,
often called burn-in, should be discarded. Moreover, since each iteration ob-
tained through Gibbs sampling builds on the previous one, these draws will be
correlated over iterations even after convergence has been achieved. To reduce
the amount of correlation among the draws, Train (2003) suggests using only
a portion of the draws that are obtained after convergence. 70,000 iterations
of the Gibbs sampling are performed in my estimation. I discard the initial
50,000 iterations and retain every tenth draw in the subsequent 20,000 itera-
tions. I then use the retained 2,000 draws to compute the estimates and the
standard errors of the model parameters.
1.5 Estimation Results
Table 1.5 presents the MCMC estimation results for the population-
level parameters. The first 3 columns are the estimates and standard errors
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of Π and the fourth column Σθ. Based on the estimates of households’ taste
parameters for brands of the inside goods and the outside good, in general,
consumers prefer the outside good the most and then StarKist. This is re-
flected in the high frequency of no purchase and the high market share of
StarKist in the data. The estimates of the interaction terms between brands
and demographics indicate that household income has the highest impact, and
household size has the lowest impact on the outside good, but they are not sig-
nificant. The estimates of households’ responses to price and to feature/display
advertising are as expected, i.e., negative and positive, respectively. The es-
timates of the interaction terms between price/advertising and demographics
indicate that households with higher income are less sensitive to both price
and feature/display and larger households are more price sensitive but less ad-
vertising sensitive. However, the estimates of the interaction terms involving
household size are not significant.
In general, the utility derived from the outside good is concave with
respect to the elapsed time since last consumption, i.e., the effect of the lapse
of consumption on the no purchase utility is positive first and then turns neg-
ative. For example, for households with median income ($27,500) and median
size (3 members), Figure 1.7 illustrates how their utility from the outside good
changes w.r.t. the elapsed time since last consumption. It seems that house-
holds’ decisions of whether or not to consume canned tuna initially exhibit a
degree of habit persistence, i.e., over some interval a category purchase be-
comes less likely with the passage of time. However, after a sufficiently long
time without consuming canned tuna, households eventually become more
likely to make a purchase as time passes. Chiang (1991) includes the length
of the interval since last purchase of any brand in his model as well. His
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estimates suggest a negative impact of time on the no purchase probability,
which is as expected since he uses this variable as an inventory proxy. That
is, a longer time since last purchase is interpreted to mean lower inventories,
and thus a higher likelihood of making a purchase during the current shopping
trip. In my model, I assume that households do not stockpile, so a negative
relationship between time-since-last-purchase and the no purchase probability
is interpreted as a changing preference for consuming canned tuna. Note that
if the no-stockpiling assumption did not hold, it would be difficult to separate
stockpiling behavior from preferences for spreading. Based on the estimation
results, in general, the impact of the elapsed time since last consumption on the
no purchase probability is positive when the lapse is no longer than 26 weeks,
which, in a way may be used to substantiate the earlier finding that only a
limited amount of stockpiling is present in this product category. Moreover,
even though the estimated coefficient for this variable is statistically signifi-
cant, the magnitude is very small, which makes little differences in terms of
aggregate demand over time. An exercise is performed to investigate its effect
on category sales over time following a price promotion. I find that if there
is a sale (of any brand and a price discount of 10% to 50%) in a week, on
average, category sales in the following non-sale week increase only 0.37% and
the magnitude of this change becomes smaller and smaller over time. For ex-
ample, after 5 weeks, it is less than 0.1%. Average sales of canned tuna in a
busy store during a non-sale week are about 400 cans, which means that the
increased sales are less than 2 cans the week after a price promotion. Since
the inter-temporal demand effect caused by the elapsed time since last con-
sumption is so small, retailers or manufacturers probably do not consider this
variable when making their pricing decisions. I thus ignore it when simulating
consumer demand in the later exercises.
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Recall that the coefficients, αi and ρi, are transformations of normals.
As an example, for a household with median income and size, αi is about
0.110 and ρi is about 0.496.
3 The results imply that marginal utility decreases
at a pretty fast rate with respect to quantity consumed and the unobserved
components of utility for the alternatives in the same nest (i.e., alternatives of
same quantity across brands) are indeed correlated.
Finally, the nested-logit-random-coefficients model of consumer demand
can be estimated by either the simulated maximum likelihood method or the
MCMC methods. However, the latter enables the recovery of individual-level
parameters. The value of this additional information depends on how much
consumer heterogeneity is accounted for by observed consumer characteris-
tics. Table 1.6 provides such an evaluation. Note that Σθ measures the con-
ditional variance of individual-level parameters, θi’s (i.e., the dispersion of
θi across households conditional on demographics). Therefore, by combining
the magnitude of Σθ with the unconditional variability of the elements in θi
across households, we can estimate the proportion of heterogeneity which is
accounted for by the observed consumer characteristics (Rossi, McCulloch,
and Allenby, 1996). I define a statistic, λ2, as λ2 = 1− var(ν)
var(θ)
, where var(ν) is
the variance of the unobservable component and var(θ) is the total variation.
λ2 measures the proportion of the variation in the values of individual-level
parameters which can be explained by household demographics. According to
Table 1.6, the demographic variables are best at explaining the variation in
households’ parameters on CKN (70%), StarKist(67%), and the outside good
3These individual-level parameters are calculated based on the estimates re-
ported in Table 1.5. αi =
exp[−1.934+(−0.127)×ln(2.75)+(−0.011)×3]




(57%), are modest at explaining the variation in households’ parameters on
the private label (37%), Three Diamond (34%), and the elapsed time since
last consumption (36% and 30%), are not so good at explaining the variation
in price sensitivity (17%), and are worst at explaining the variation in the
values of the rest (less than 7%). I think the inference about individual-level
parameters enabled by the MCMC method is useful here since demographic
variables have limited value in predicting how households respond to prices,
while price sensitivity is indeed a key determinant for price elasticities and thus
has important implications for potential profitability of price promotions. As
a result, market-wide responses to price promotions and own- and cross-price
elasticities are estimated by aggregating across the responses of the sample
households, utilizing the recovered individual-level parameters to account for
parameter uncertainty.
1.6 Price Elasticities and Sales Bump Decomposition
Table 1.7 reports the own- and cross-price elasticities of the 4 brands
and the elasticities of the no purchase probability. Price elasticities are com-
puted by aggregating over the simulated responses of the sample households
using the estimated individual-level parameters. I compute the elasticity ma-
trices for each store-week when the prices are distributed as in the data and
take the average.
The orders of the own-price and no purchase elasticities are close to
the order of the market shares of the 4 brands, e.g., StarKist which has the
highest market share is least price elastic and is most likely to cause category
expansion when its price is dropped. Note that the estimated brand-preference
coefficient for StarKist is the highest compared to those for the other 3 brands.
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Therefore, assuming that the magnitude of brand-preference coefficients is an
indicator of brand quality, it seems that a price promotion on the brand with
higher quality has a greater category expansion effect. The low variation in
the cross-price elasticities in each column may suggest the independence-of-
irrelevant-alternative property of a logit model. However, it is not easy to
eliminate this problem since the products included in the demand system are
pretty homogenous and I could not think of other product characteristics,
except for “brand”, to differentiate these products.
As often observed in the data, a temporary price reduction can boost
the quantity demanded for a brand and thus generate a sales bump. Increased
demand for a brand that is on sale may stem from three different responses
to price promotions: first, some consumers who are buying other brands when
brand X is not on sale may switch to brand X when brand X is on sale;
second, some consumers who are buying brand X at its regular (non-sale)
price may purchase a greater quantity of brand X when it is on sale; and
third, some consumers who buy nothing in this product category without any
price promotion may decide to purchase brand X when it is on sale. Therefore,
a promotional sales bump can be decomposed into three components: brand-
switching, purchase quantity, and purchase incidence.
Marketing researchers are interested in the relative sizes of these three
components because of their implications for the relative profitability of price
promotions as perceived by manufacturers and retailers. If a sales bump comes
mainly from consumer brand switching, then it profits one manufacturer (of
brand X) at the expense of another, and may be of relatively little benefit
to the retailer (if, e.g., the margin on brand X is lower when it is on sale).
Retailers may profit more if price promotions have a large impact on purchase
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incidence and purchase quantity, since overall sales of the whole category then
increase. To study the retailer-manufacturer split of the benefits from price
promotions, I simulate the sample households’ reactions to price promotions
using the demand-side estimates and decompose a sales bump into the brand-
switching, purchase-incidence, and purchase-quantity effects.
Table 1.8 presents the results of sales bump decomposition with differ-
ent magnitudes of retail price discount and the percentage increases in sales of
the promoted brand and the product category as a whole. It is computed as
follows. First, I assume the “regular” prices of the 4 brands to be the average
shelf prices over the sample period (shown in the last column of Table 1.2),
and I compute the “baseline market demand” for each brand at their regular
prices by aggregating across the demand of the sample households. Second,
for each brand in turn, I drop its regular price by a certain percentage (10%-
50%), and I decompose the sample households’ responses to price promotions
into 3 components: brand switching, purchase incidence, and purchase quan-
tity by comparing the changes in their choice probabilities due to these price
reductions. Finally, the market-wide decomposition is derived by aggregating
across the sample households’ responses.
As the magnitude of discount changes, the proportions of the increased
sales of the promoted brand which can be attributed to brand switching, pur-
chase incidence, and purchase quantity change too. In general, the greater is a
price discount, the lower is the proportion attributable to brand switching and
the higher are the proportions attributable to purchase incidence and purchase
quantity (except for StarKist). Comparing the results among the 4 brands,
it seems that the higher the quality of the promoted brand as measured by
the estimated brand-preference coefficients, the higher is the proportion of in-
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creased sales attributable to purchase incidence, and the lower the quality of
the promoted brand, the higher is the proportion of the increased sales at-
tributable to brand switching. Moreover, the percentage increase in sales of
the promoted brand is higher for lower-quality brands and the percentage in-
crease in sales of the category as a whole is greater for higher-quality brands.
Therefore, price promotions on the brand with the highest quality have the
greatest category expansion effect, which is also implied by the elasticities of
no purchase probability reported in Table 1.7. The generally large proportion
of increased sales attributable to purchase incidence implies that in the canned
tuna product category price promotions are relatively more effective in moving
consumers from no purchase to purchase.
Most papers in the marketing leterature which study consumers’ pur-
chase behavior and decompose consumers’ responses to marketing variables
use are elasticity-based decompositions. For example, Gupta (1988), Chiang
(1991), Chintagunta (1993), Bucklin, Gupta, and Siddarth (1998), and Bell,
Chiang and Padmanabhan (1999) model all three purchase decisions simulta-
neously (i.e., when, what and how much to buy), so the total price elasticity
can be obtained as a sum of brand-choice elasticity, purchase-incidence elas-
ticity, and purchase-quantity elasticity. Across these studies, on average 74%
of the total price elasticity is attributable to brand switching. Intuitively, one
may tend to interpret this result as indicating that if the increased sales of
the promoted brand are 100 units, the sales of non-promoted brands in the
same product category decrease by 74 units. Then price promotions look to be
more effective in drawing consumers from competitive brands than in expand-
ing category sales. However, Heerde, Gupta, and Wittink (2003) point out
that such an interpretation, i.e., interpreting the percentage of elasticity due
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to brand switching as the ratio of the lost sales of the non-promoted brands
to the increased sales of the promoted brand, is incorrect. This is because
the brand-switching effect in the elasticity-based decomposition measures the
changes in brand choice probability conditional on purchase occurrence, i.e.,
it measures the gross change in sales for the non-promoted brands when cat-
egory volume is held constant. However, since price promotions usually have
a positive effect on purchase-incidence probability, the part of the increased
sales of the promoted brand that is attributable to the decreased sales of the
non-promoted brands (i.e., the net change) will be smaller when the increase
in category volume is accounted for.
Heerde, Gupta, and Wittink (2003) thus propose a complementary de-
composition measure which is based on unit sales and apply this measure to
the same data used in Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan (1999). They find
that the 75% brand-switching effect reported by Bell et al. translates to only
33% using the unit sales decomposition. The decomposition results reported
in Table 1.8 are unit sales based and they show that in the canned tuna prod-
uct category, the sales bump attributable to brand switching is about 36% on
average across brands and magnitudes of discount. Therefore, the unit-sales-
based decomposition results suggest that the brand-switching effect of price
promotions may be much smaller than has been previously assumed, and may
be more consistent with the frequent sales observed in retail stores.
1.7 Retailer Markups
In this section, the demand estimates are applied to the supply side to
investigate the pricing behavior of retailers. Retailer r’s operating profit at
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(prjt − wprjt)qrjt(prt) (1.9)
Here prjt and wprjt are retailer r’s price and marginal cost (i.e., wholesale price)
of product j at week t respectively, and qrjt is the demand for product j retailer
r faces at week t. If we assume that retailers choose retail prices to maximize
per period category-level profits, then the profit-maximizing retail prices, prt,
should satisfy a system of first order conditions described by Equation (1.10).



































Therefore, retailer r’s marginal costs (and markups) can be backed out using
Equation (1.11).
wprt = prt + Ω
−1
rt qrt(prt) (1.11)
Table 1.9 reports the average marginal costs (across time and stores
within the same chain) for each brand-chain. It shows that not only do
marginal costs vary across brands carried by the same retailer, but the marginal
costs of the same brand vary across retailers as well. A possible explanation
for the former is that manufacturers may have different production costs or
markups. As regards the latter, retailers have different degrees of bargain-
ing power against manufacturers in negotiating wholesale prices, or they may
incur some sort of retailer-specific costs.
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The estimates reported in Table 1.9 implicitly assume that price promo-
tions are induced by manufacturers’ trade deals, i.e., manufacturers sell their
products at a temporary price reduction to retailers. If that is the case, we can
estimate retailer pass-through, defined as the ratio of retail price reduction to
wholesale price reduction. I conduct a counterfactual experiment to measure
the possible range of retailer pass-through in the canned-tuna product cate-
gory. For simplicity, I focus on only two brands, StarKist and CKN, since
the manufacturers of these two brands are well-established big companies and
are more likely to be able to afford and offer trade deals to retailers. I fix
the non-sale retail prices of the two brands at $0.89 (which is the modal price
observed in the data) and vary the sale prices to be $0.69, $0.59, and $0.49. 4
scenarios are considered: no sale for both StarKist and CKN, a sale for both, a
sale only for StarKist, and a sale only for CKN. I then use Equation (1.11) to
back out the associated wholesale prices, assuming that the retailer’s marginal
costs consist of only wholesale prices.
Table 1.10 presents the results of this counterfactual experiment. It
shows that given a trade deal provided by the manufacturer, the retailer passes
on to consumers the full amount of the wholesale price reduction, and then
some, i.e., retailer pass-through exceeds 100%. Moreover, retailer pass-through
is higher when sales of the two brands do not occur at the same time, and it
decreases with respect to depths of the deals. The empirical findings from
prior research on manufacturers’ trade deals show that retailer pass-through
can range from 0% to more than 100% (Tyagi, 1999). A pass-through rate of
more than 100% may seem counter-intuitive at first glance, but it is consistent
with a log-convex demand function (Amir, 2005). Since I do not have a closed-
form demand function and retailers may be more concerned about category
31
sales, I simulate category demand by changing StarKist’s (CKN’s) retail price
while fixing CKN’s (StarKist’s) price at the non-sale level ($0.89). Figure 1.8
displays the logarithm of these two simulated category demand functions, and
they are convex.
The analysis of markups and pass-through assumes that demand is
static, which means the retailer does not face any inter-temporal trade-offs
in pricing its products. As mentioned earlier, a reduced-form examination
suggests that consumer stockpiling is not an important factor in this product
category (see Chapter 3). Although I have taken into account the possibility
that preferences may change over time by allowing utility to depend on the
elapsed time since last consumption, the magnitude of this effect on quantity
demanded is very small and can be ignored (see Section 1.5). I also considered
some form of time-varying brand loyalty by allowing utility to depend on
the brand consumers purchased last time. The estimated coefficient for this
variable turns out to be small, negative, and insignificant. Therefore, it seems
that retailers have no reason to engage in inter-temporal price discrimination
nor do they face any significant dynamics in consumer demand that may arise
from non-additive preferences.
The analysis also ignores any dynamics that may arise from retailer
inventory decisions. This assumption is more problematic. Retailers may take
advantage of manufacturers’ trade deals and forward buy or they may incur
fixed ordering costs, both of which would make retailers keep inventory and
thus influence their pricing behavior. See Dreze and Bell (2001) for more
details on the former issue and Aguirregabiria (1999) on the latter.
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1.8 Retailer Price Promotions
A more fundamental objection to the analysis presented in the preced-
ing section is that retailers may not be choosing prices to maximize category-
level profits. Since supermarkets sell many products, the price level of a specific
product could affect purchases not only of that product category, but also of
other product categories. Therefore, retailers may be coordinating their pric-
ing decisions across different product categories to build up store traffic and
maximize store-level profits. Indeed, some of the price reductions observed in
the data are likely to represent retailer sales, not manufacturer sales. The sim-
ple model of pricing given above cannot explain price promotions by retailers.
To investigate this issue, I resort to another data set from Dominick’s
Finer Foods (DFF) where a proxy for wholesale prices is available which helps
to distinguish price promotions by retailers from price promotions by man-
ufacturers. The DFF database is provided by the James M. Kilts Center,
GSB, University of Chicago. Dominick’s is the second biggest supermarket
chain in the metropolitan area of Chicago, Illinois. It has about 100 stores
and accounts for approximately 25% of the market in this area (Chevalier,
Kashyap and Rossi, 2000). The DFF database gives weekly retail prices, unit
sales (quantities), and retail profits for each UPC in 29 different product cat-
egories (including canned tuna) in each store from September 1989 to May
1997. Defining retail profits as percentage gross margins, gross costs can then
be recovered by multiplying retail prices with retail profits. However, these
costs represent average acquisition costs (AAC’s) of the items in inventory and
they do not exactly correspond to wholesale prices. For example, a temporary
wholesale price cut this period may take time to work itself into AAC’s as the
old higher-priced inventory carried by the retailer is being sold off. In this
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case, wholesale prices will be smaller than AAC’s. Alternatively, if the retailer
engages in forward buying during a trade deal, then the AAC’s will remain low
for some time after the wholesale prices have gone back up (Chevalier et al,
2000). In this case, wholesale price will be greater than AAC’s. Despite these
measurement errors, manufacturer-driven price promotions are still observable
since off-invoice discounts (which are the most important component of manu-
facturers’ trade promotion expenditures) and promotional moneys for feature
advertisements and special displays are accounted for and thus reflected in
AAC’s (Chintagunta, 2002). There may exist other promotional agreements
between the manufacturers and Dominick’s which do not show up in AAC’s,
but this issue is too hard to deal with. Here I assume that the discrepancy be-
tween AAC’s and wholesale prices is small and can be ignored. Thus I simply
treat AAC’s as measuring wholesale prices.
I examine the retail and wholesale price patterns of StarKist and CKN
in different stores. I find that wholesale prices display little variation across
stores, but retail prices vary substantially across stores in different zones. Do-
minick’s adopted zone pricing during the sample period (Chintagunta, Dube
and Singh, 2002). I also find that a wholesale price reduction is always accom-
panied by a retail price reduction. However, retail price reductions frequently
occur during periods when there is no change in wholesale prices. Therefore,
it seems that most price promotions are retailer-driven. Figures 1.9 and 1.10
illustrate the retail and wholesale prices of StarKist and CKN over time in two
Dominick’s stores.
Based on the setup of supply side in the previous section, retailers incur
losses of category profits from their sales. I then conduct a counterfactual
experiment to quantify the potential losses due to retailer’s price promotions.
34
First, I assume that the product category consists of only two brands,
StarKist and CKN, and that their wholesale prices are the same and con-
stant. I vary wholesale prices in the range from $0.49 to $0.64, which is
about the range of regular wholesale prices observed in the DFF database.
Second, given the wholesale prices, I compute the category-profit-maximizing
retail prices (the “optimal” prices) and the demand using the demand-side
estimates. Finally, I compare the retailer’s category profits under two scenar-
ios. In “Scenario 1”, the retailer adopts the optimal prices for two weeks. In
“Scenario 2”, the retailer runs a price promotion for StarKist in one week and
a price promotion for CKN in the other week where the non-sale price is $0.89
and the sale price is $0.69.
Table 1.11 reports the results of this counterfactual experiment. The
last column of Table 1.11 shows that the loss of category profits increases in
wholesale prices, as expected. The more interesting point in this counterfactual
is that if the modal non-sale price ($0.89) observed in the data is actually the
optimal retail price (which implies the wholesale price is about $0.54), then
by running staggered sales on StarKist and CKN, the retailer incurs a loss of
about 17% of the category profits.
I conduct another counterfactual experiment using Dominick’s data to
estimate the loss of category profits from retailers’ cyclical pricing. This coun-
terfactual is conducted as follows. First, for a given store, I sample 3000
households using the demand-side estimates and the distribution of house-
hold income in the zip code area where the store is located (I assume that
the income distribution is lognormal and a store-level income distribution is
estimated using the Census 2000 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau). Sec-
ond, given the observed weekly retail prices, I simulate demand for StarKist
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and CKN by aggregating the demand of the 3000 sample households and then
calculate the weekly category profits, i.e., “weekly data profits”, using the ob-
served weekly wholesale prices. Third, I compute the “total data profits” by
summing the “weekly data profits” over the sample period. Fourth, given the
observed weekly wholesale prices and the demand condition generated by the
3000 sample households, I compute the “weekly optimal prices” which maxi-
mize each store’s weekly category profits. Given the “weekly optimal prices”,
I first simulate demand, and then calculate the weekly category profits, i.e.,
“weekly optimal profits”, using the observed weekly wholesale prices. Finally,
I compute the “total optimal profits” by summing the “weekly optimal profits”
over the sample period. The ratios of “total data profits” over “total optimal
profits” for 16 Dominick’s stores are reported in the last column of Table 1.12.
The loss of category profits from retailers’ cyclical pricing ranges from
19% to 44%, depending on a store’s retail price pattern. In general, the loss
is greater for the stores which have lower non-sale prices and hold less fre-
quent sales (referred to as “every-day-low-price” stores) and the loss is smaller
for the stores which have higher non-sale prices and hold more frequent sales
(referred to as “high-low” stores). Figures 1.9 and Figure 1.10 illustrate the
“optimal” price patterns in a “every-day-low-price” store and a “high-low”
store respectively, and show that there is a tendency for my demand model to
over-predict retail markups. Overestimation of markups and the heterogeneity
in price patterns across stores suggest that retail price levels and price promo-




Using scanner data on household purchases of canned tuna in Spring-
field, MO, I empirically examine the impact of price promotions on consumer
demand. The finding is that market-expansion effects usually dominate the
brand-switching effect. I then apply the demand estimates to the supply side
to investigate the profitability of retailer price promotions. A counterfactual
experiment on Dominick’s data shows that the loss from retailers’ cyclical pric-
ing is not small. Judging from the tendency of my model to over-predict retail
markups, and from the variation in markups across stores, retailer price pro-
motions reflect local competition among stores for customers who find shop-
ping around costly. Intertemporal demand effects such as inventory effects,
state-dependent preferences and brand loyalty effects are ruled out as possible
drivers of sales. Future investigations of the motivations fr retailer sales may
therefore need to incorporate competition into the current model.
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Store-Brand Entry on
Consumer Demand and Welfare: An
Empirical Study in the Hot-Breakfast Cereals
Product Category
2.1 Introduction
One noticeable phenomenon in the supermarket industry in the recent
two decades is the strong prevalence of store brand (SB) products in retailers’
chain stores. According to the Private Label Manufacturers Association, in
2003, the total market share of SB’s in supermarkets came in at 20.7% in terms
of units and 16.3% in terms of dollars, and total sales reached $42.9 billion.
One reason that retailers are spending resources on creating and maintaining
their own brands is because a successful SB program is viewed as an advan-
tageous competitive strategy to them. For example, since consumers can buy
NB products everywhere, but they can only buy a certain retailer’s SB prod-
ucts in its chain stores, SB’s can help retailers differentiate themselves from
their competitors. Some empirical analyses in the literature show that SB’s
contribute to greater store loyalty and increase retailers’ profits (Corstjens and
Lal, 2000; Sudhir and Talukdar, 2004). Moreover, if a considerable amount of
current NB buyers switch to SB’s after they enter the market, retailers may
be able to increase their bargaining power against NB manufacturers. There
is empirical evidence showing that retailers’ bargaining position is strength-
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ened after they introduce SB’s (Narashimhan and Wilcox, 1998; Morton and
Zettelmeyer, 2000). In this chapter, I study the effects of SB entry on consumer
demand and welfare.
Both retailers and NB manufacturers may be interested in knowing
how demand could be affected by the entry of SB’s. The former have direct
control over SB’s and the latter face additional competition from SB’s. In
most cases, SB’s are “me-too” products which imitate the leading NB’s in a
product category. Moreover, they are usually priced quite lower than NB’s and
have higher retail margins.1 For retailers, by introducing the low-priced SB’s
into a product category, not only may it induce some current NB buyers to
switch to SB’s, but the total category sales may expand if SB’s can attract new
consumers who find NB’s too expensive. However, even though the margins of
SB’s are generally higher than those of NB’s, since their prices are lower, it is
not necessarily the case that retailers can earn higher profits simply by stealing
more business from NB’s. Retailers need to understand the way SB entry
affects the demand elasticities of incumbent NB’s so that their pricing among
NB’s and SB’s achieves the goal of profit maximization. As for NB managers,
an understanding of whether consumers have shifted away from their brands
to SB’s and of the potential changes in consumers’ price sensitivities given
their current marketing activities could help them decide how to respond to
SB entry, e.g., whether it is necessary to increase advertising expenditures to
improve brand perception and strengthen brand loyalty in a given market area
(Chintagunta et al, 2002).
The first step of my empirical approach to studying the effects of SB
1retail margin = ( retail price−wholesale priceretail price )%
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entry on consumer demand and welfare is to estimate consumer demand for
NB’s and SB’s in a particular product category - hot-breakfast cereals - using
scanner data from a multi-store supermarket chain in a major metropolitan
area. The demand side is modeled by a random-coefficients logit model and
estimated by the GMM approach where retail prices are instrumented to ac-
count for the potential problem of endogeneity. Since SB’s are introduced
during the sample period, given the demand-side estimates, I examine how
the entry of SB’s affects the demand elasticities of incumbent NB’s by com-
paring the own-price elasticities of NB’s before and after SB entry. I further
study consumers’ patterns of substitution between national and store brands
(e.g., whether consumers tend to substitute within NB’s/SB’s, or substitute
between SB’s and their corresponding imitated NB’s) by examining the cross-
price elasticities of national and store brands. Finally, I quantify the changes
in consumer welfare due to the entry of SB’s. The empirical findings are:
(1) After the entry of SB’s, demand becomes more elastic for non-imitated
NB’s, and either more elastic or shows no change for imitated NB’s; (2) in
general, substitution patterns for NB’s and SB’s are asymmetric, i.e. when
the prices of their favorite products increase, most NB buyers tend to substi-
tute to other NB products, but SB buyers will substitute to the corresponding
imitated NB’s; (3) the increase in consumer surplus due to the entry of SB’s
is trivial for an individual consumer ($0.001/week assuming that consumers
have a unit demand of one serving per week), but the aggregate benefit could
be quite substantial ($5,566/week for the market under study).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides
an overview of the demand model. Section 2.3 describes the data. Section
2.4 discusses the estimation procedure. Section 2.5 presents the estimation
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results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Demand Model
The demand side is specified by a random-coefficients logit model which
has two advantages over other types of demand models. First, suppose demand
for a product category containing a large number of differentiated products, n,
is to be estimated. If no restriction is imposed, we’ll need to estimate at least
n2 parameters in a log-log demand model. The logit specification can reduce
the dimensionality problem if consumer preferences can be projected onto a
set of exogenous product characteristics. Moreover, the additional random-
coefficients specification allows more flexible own-price and cross-price elastic-
ities. In a standard logit model, products with the same market share have the
same own-price demand derivative, which implies the same markup in a single-
product-firm setting. However, market share should not be the only factor that
determines a product’s markup. Instead, in a random-coefficients logit model,
own-price demand derivatives are more flexible because they are driven by the
price sensitivities and purchase probabilities of heterogeneous consumers. In
other words, the independence-of-irrelevant-alternatives (I.I.A.) property in a
logit model imposes strong restrictions on the substitution patterns among the
products. By adding a random component to the coefficients, cross-price elas-
ticities are driven by the products’ characteristics and consumers’ preferences
over those characteristics, which generates more realistic substitution patterns
(Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2000).
The demand side is specified as follows. Suppose there are T markets,
and in each market, there are It consumers and Jt products. Let t denote
market, t = 1, . . . , T ; i denote consumer, i = 1, . . . , It; and j denote product,
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j = 1, . . . , Jt. Here a market is defined as a store-week combination. Consumer
i’s conditional indirect utility from product j at market t is
uijt = xjβi + αipjt + λSD t + γdjt + ξj + Mξjt + εijt (2.1)
Here xj is a vector of product j’s observed product characteristics and βi is
consumer i’s taste for xj; pjt is the price of product j at market t and αi is
consumer i’s price sensitivity or marginal utility of income; SD is a dummy
variable for the summer season (June, July and August) which controls for
the possible seasonal effects on utility for the product category and λ is the
parameter on SD ; djt is a dummy variable indicating whether product j is on
promotion at market t and γ measures consumers’ sensitivity to promotions;
λ and γ are assumed be the same for all consumers. The parameter ξj is the
mean valuation of product j’s unobserved product characteristics and Mξjt is a
market specific deviation from this mean; Mξjt may be caused by factors such
as shelf space, shelf location, or other unobserved demand drivers which vary
across stores and weeks; finally, εijt is the idiosyncratic taste which is indepen-
dently and identically distributed across consumers, products, and markets
and follows a Type I extreme-value distribution.
The individual-specific parameters are assumed to follow a multivariate










+ ΠDi + Σνi, (2.2)
where νi ∼ N(0, I)
Here Di is a vector of observed consumer characteristics of consumer i and Π is
a matrix of parameters measuring how consumers’ preferences vary with demo-
graphics; νi is a vector drawn from a multivariate standard normal distribution
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and is interpreted as unobserved consumer characteristics affecting consumers’











+ ΠDi and a
diagonal covariance matrix Σ2.
In addition to the Jt “inside” goods at market t, an “outside” good has
to be introduced in order to complete the demand system. A choice to purchase
the outside good means that a consumer chooses not to purchase any of the
Jt inside goods. According to Berry (1994), without the outside good option,
a homogeneous increase in prices of all inside goods will not cause a decrease
in total category demand, i.e., category demand is perfectly inelastic. This is
unreasonable since product categories can be substitutes for each other (if the
definition for a product category is not too broad). Therefore, demand for a
product category is usually not perfectly inelastic. For identification purposes,
the indirect utility from the outside good is normalized to ui0t = 0 + εi0t.
Following Nevo (2001), combining Equation (2.1) and Equation(2.2)
results in:
uijt = δjt(xj, pjt, ξj,Mξjt; θ1) + µijt(xj, pjt, νi, Di; θ2) + εijt (2.3)
Where



















The indirect utility in Equation (2.3) consists of two parts: δjt and µijt+εijt. δjt
represents the mean utility, which does not vary across consumers at market
t and µijt + εijt is a heteroskedastic deviation from the mean utility, which
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captures the effect of random coefficients. The vector θ denotes all of the
parameters to be estimated in the model.
Assuming that consumers have unit demand and choose a product
which maximizes utility and that ties occur with zero probability, product
j’s share in market t is




dF ∗(D, ν, ε) (2.4)
Where
Ajt(x, pt, δt; θ2) = {(Di, νi, εit)| uijt > uilt, for l = 0, 1, . . . , Jt}
Here x, pt, and δt are, respectively, observed product characteristics, prices
and mean utility levels of the inside goods at market t, and F ∗(D, ν, ε) is the
joint distribution of individual attributes.
Given the values of the parameters and the joint distribution of indi-
vidual attributes, Equation (2.4) can be computed either analytically or nu-
merically. One approach to estimation is to choose the parameter values which
minimize the distance between the predicted market shares derived from Equa-
tion (2.4) and the observed shares in the data. To do so, two problems have to
be addressed first. The first comes from the fact that market size is usually not
directly observed. According to Berry (1994), most of the time, researchers
only have information on quantities being purchased for the Jt inside goods at
each market. In order to compute the Jt +1 market shares, i.e., market shares
for both inside and outside goods, total market size must be estimated. Nevo
(2000) makes market size proportional to an observed measure of market pop-
ulation. He suggests that this measure should be chosen so that the potential
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market is large enough to allow for a non-zero outside good market share and
so that the estimated results should not be too sensitive to the definition. The
second problem is that prices are potentially correlated with the unobserved
demand shocks, ξj+Mξjt. Therefore, in order to consistently estimate the pa-
rameters, prices have to be instrumented by variables which are correlated
with them but uncorrelated with the unobserved demand shocks. Regarding
the first problem, I define the potential market size as a store’s average num-
ber of visiting customers each week multiplied by the average household size
of the zip code area where the store is located. As for the second problem,
I use lagged retailer average acquisition costs as the instrumental variables.
Details are provided in sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2.
2.3 Data Description
The two major databases used for estimation are the Dominick’s Finer
Foods data from the James M. Kilts Center, GSB, University of Chicago and
Census 2000 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau.
2.3.1 Dominick’s Finer Foods Data
Dominick’s Finer Foods (DFF) is the second largest supermarket chain
in the metropolitan area of Chicago, Illinois. DFF has about 100 stores and
has a market share of around 25% in this area (Chevaleir, Kashyap and Rossi,
2000). The variables in the DFF data include retail prices, unit sales, retail
profits, and a deal code indicating whether a product was sold on a promotion.
The data are provided on a weekly basis from September 1989 to May 1997 for
each UPC in 29 different product categories and for each store. Weekly store
traffic is also available and is defined as the total number of customers who
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visited the store and made a purchase during a week. One feature of the DFF
data is that it reveals information on the retailer’s profit margins through the
retail profits variable which is defined as the percentage gross margins DFF
makes on the dollar sales for each UPC. Therefore, retail costs can be recovered
by multiplying retail prices with retail profits. However, according to the data
provider, the costs recovered this way are average acquisition costs (AAC) of
the items in inventory and they do not exactly correspond to the retailer’s
marginal (or replacement) costs.
The particular product category studied here is hot-breakfast cereals.
There are data on 96 UPC’s from June 1991 to April 1997 (304 weeks) for each
store in this product category. However, the data are not balanced, i.e., not
all the UPC’s are offered in all the stores all the time. Entries of new UPC’s
and exits of old ones are observed during the sample period. To reduce the
number of inside goods, I first select 23 of the 96 UPC’s and then aggregate
some of them together, which generates 11 “final products” to be included in
the demand system. The following describes how the 23 UPC’s are chosen.
I first select all SB’s in this product category (6 UPC’s). Then for NB’s, I
only select those which are available in the market during the whole sample
period and have relatively high category shares (17 UPC’s). The reason that I
aggregate over some subsets of the 23 UPC’s is because the UPC’s in the same
subset not only share very similar product characteristics, but their prices
are almost always the same. Therefore, aggregation does not seem to hurt
the identification of the key parameters we are interested in and makes the
demand model more parsimonious.
Towards the end of the sample period, the retailer introduced a total
of 6 SB’s into this product category. 5 SB’s entered the market in the 123rd
46
data week and the sixth SB in the 203rd data week. Since I am interested in
studying the effects of SB entry on consumer demand, I include all SB’s in
the demand system. But because the SB introduced last is to be aggregated
with two of the SB’s introduced earlier, I didn’t use the data from the 80-week
period between the introduction of the first five SB’s and the sixth SB. In my
model, I assume that consumers have perfect information on all products in
the same category. Therefore, I would like to treat this period as some sort of
learning period (i.e., since it is the first time SB products were introduced into
this category, consumers need some time to try and learn about their qualities)
to justify the decision of disregarding the data during the learning period. In
addition, I assume that consumers know the quality of the SB introduced last
from their previous usage of the two SB’s which are in the same product line
as the 6th SB. Thus no more learning time is needed. Therefore, the data used
for estimation can be separated into two periods: the first period (the “before”
SB entry period) is before any of the 6 SB’s entered the market, which is from
data week 4 to 122 (06/27/91 - 10/13/93), and the second period (the “after”
SB entry period) is after all 6 SB’s entered, which is from data week 206 to
304 (05/25/95 - 04/30/97).
Table 2.1 contains basic information about the 23 UPC’s included in
the demand system, including UPC number, product name, unit weight (mea-
sured by oz), serving size, and the “product” into which the UPC’s are to be
aggregated. I use serving as the measurement unit and convert sales volume
into number of servings to compute each product’s market share. The serving
size per container is based on the table of nutrition facts printed on the pack-
age. One reason for using serving, instead of weight, as the measurement unit
is that the UPC’s that are aggregated together have the same serving size even
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though their unit weights are different. For instant hot-breakfast cereals, the
serving sizes are intuitive: the serving size per container corresponds to the
number of individually wrapped packs per container. As for non-instant ones,
the packages are one single box or tube without separately wrapped small
packs. Therefore, I assume that consumers’ consumption amount follows the
per serving size suggested by the manufacturers.
After aggregation, there are 11 products in the demand system. These
products can be differentiated in several ways, including type of grain (wheat
or oats), ease of preparation (instant or non-instant), packaging (small packs,
regular box/tube, or big tube), flavor (original or flavored), and manufactur-
ers/brands (Nabisco, Quaker, or Dominick’s). Table 2.2 lists the 11 products
and their observed product characteristics. Products 1 to 7 are NB’s (i.e., with
brand name either Nabisco or Quaker) and Products 8 to 11 are SB’s (i.e., with
brand name Dominick’s). The coefficient on the product characteristic, “con-
stant”, can be interpreted as consumers’ preferences for Quaker’s non-instant,
original oats with regular packaging (referred as the “base product”) relative
to the outside good. Because all Nabisco-manufactured products are wheat
and all wheat products are manufactured by Nabisco, consumers’ preferences
for wheat and Nabisco cannot be identified separately, i.e., only the coefficient
on “wheat/Nabisco” can be identified. Similarly, because all the instant prod-
ucts have the packaging of individually wrapped packs and vice versa, only
the coefficient on “instant/small-pack” can be identified. Finally, Products 8,
9, 10 and 11 are the SB versions of the NB products, Products 4, 5, 6, and 7;
each pair has the same product characteristics except the characteristic, “SB”.
Therefore, the coefficient on “SB” can be viewed as consumers’ valuation of
the brand name - Dominick’s relative to the brand name - Quaker, which may
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be affected by factors such as vertical quality differences between SB’s and
imitated NB’s or the strength of brand image (due to advertising etc.).
2.3.2 Census 2000 Data
In the random-coefficients specification, I allow individual parameters
to vary with demographics. In practice, I use two observed consumer character-
istics to interact with the observed product characteristics and prices, i.e., log-
arithm of household income (“logincome”) and a dummy variable (“hhund18”)
which equals one if a household has members under eighteen and zero other-
wise. The distributions of the two demographic variables are estimated using
the Census 2000 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau. I select sixteen of the
96 stores owned by DFF, which are in operation during the whole sample pe-
riod and have relatively fewer missing data. Information about each store’s
location, including address, zip code, and city is available in the data. Since
Census 2000 Data are accessible at the zip code level, I use them to create
store-level demographic distributions. The distribution of household income
in the census data is discrete, given as the percentage of households in ten
income intervals. To ease the process of sampling household income when
simulating market shares, I assume that the distribution of household income
is log-normal. I then estimate the parameters (mean and variance) by the
least squares method, i.e., by fitting the estimated log-normal distribution
to the empirical distribution in the Census data. As for the distribution of
“hhund18”, I assume that it follows a Bernoulli distribution. I simply take the
sample proportion of households with individuals under age 18 in the Census
data as the parameter. Moreover, because I don’t have information on the joint
distribution of “logincome” and “hhund18”, I assume that the marginal dis-
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tributions on these two variables are independent. For each store, 63 samples
are drawn from the store-level demographic distributions by Halton sequences,
and the same sets of samples are used for these stores over time. Table 2.3
lists the 16 stores and the store-level demographics.
2.4 Estimation Procedure
2.4.1 Market Shares
Serving is used as the measurement unit to define market shares. In
order to construct market shares for both inside and outside goods, market size
has to be defined. The DFF data contain information on weekly store traffic
defined as the number of customers who visit the store and make a purchase
during a week. I assume that each household visits a store once a week and
that demand for this product category is one serving per household member
per week. For each store, I first compute the average weekly store traffic over
the sample period. Then I define the potential market size for a store as its
average weekly traffic multiplied by the average household size of the zip code
area where the store is located. The last two columns in Table 2.3 report the
average household size and store traffic of the sixteen stores. I use average
weekly store traffic, instead of weekly store traffic, to compute market size
since it is more likely that weekly store traffic can be correlated with prices.
It seems more reasonable to assume that average weekly store traffic and thus
market size is exogenous with respect to prices of inside goods. By defining
market size in this way, market size is time invariant for each store. Given
the potential market size, I convert the unit sales of each product into total
number of servings and divide them by the potential market size to derive the
market shares for the inside goods. Since market shares should sum to one, the
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market share of the outside good is defined as the difference between one and
the sum of the market shares of the inside good. Finally, besides sales volume,
prices and costs are converted into prices and costs per serving as well and
then deflated by the yearly CPI in the Chicago-Gary-Kenosha area (the CPI
data are from the U.S. Department of Labor). In the case when a product is
the aggregation result of more than one UPC, I use volume-weighted average
price.
2.4.2 Instruments
Because prices are potentially correlated with unobserved demand shocks,
instrumental variables for prices are needed in order to get a consistent esti-
mator. Cost variables are traditionally appropriate instruments (Berry, 1994).
Moreover, lagged values of these variables also provide natural candidates in
many time-series settings (Greene, pp 375). Therefore, I use lagged average
acquisition costs (AAC’s) as the instruments for prices. AAC is the aver-
age inventory cost of an item held by a store each week and is recovered by
multiplying retail prices with retail profits. Obviously, AAC’s and prices are
correlated. Therefore, whether they are valid IV’s depends on whether they
are correlated with unobserved demand shocks. One possibility that causes
AAC’s to be correlated with unobserved demand shocks is when the observed
product characteristics specified by researchers are not thorough enough to
capture all the factors which determine utility. Then utility derived from the
“unobserved” product characteristics will become part of unobserved demand
shocks. If these product characteristics are only “unobserved” to researchers,
not manufacturers, manufacturers will likely take them into account when pric-
ing their products, which implies that wholesale prices, as well as AAC’s, will
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be correlated with unobserved demand shocks. The solution to this problem
is to include product-specific dummy variables in the product characteristics
space. According to Nevo (2001), the coefficient on a dummy variable for, say,
product j captures the part of the mean utility which does not vary with mar-
kets, i.e., xjβ + ξj, so only the market-specific deviation, i.e., Mξjt is left in the
unobserved demand shock for product j at market t. However, if there is se-
rial correlation in Mξjt’s, since AAC’s depend on current and lagged wholesale
prices and lagged sales, they will be correlated with unobserved demand shocks
(Chintagunta, 2002). Therefore, I assume that market-specific deviations are
not serially correlated.
2.4.3 Computation
Following Nevo’s computational algorithm (Nevo 2000 and Nevo 2001),
I construct a GMM estimator for demand-side parameters. The GMM esti-
mate is
















Here Z is a set of instruments exogenous to the unobserved demand shocks;
e(θ) is an error term in the regression model and is a function of the pa-
rameters; and W is a weighting matrix. The parameters in θ2 are the interac-
tion terms between Di/νi (i.e., observed/unobserved consumer characteristics)
and X2 (i.e., price and observed product characteristics, including constant,
wheat/Nabisco, instant/small-pack, big tube, flavor, and SB); and θ1 con-
tains the parameters on X1 (i.e., price, summer dummy, deal dummy, and
product-specific dummies). Note that θ2 enters the GMM objective function
nonlinearly and θ1 linearly.
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The computational algorithm consists of 4 steps.
Step 1 : Given θ2, compute the mean utility levels, δt’s, market by
market, which solve the implicit system of equations described by Equation
(2.5).
st(X2, δt; θ2) = s
0
t , for t = 1, . . . , T (2.5)
Here st(.) is the market-share function defined by Equation (2.4) and s
0
t are
the observed market shares in the data. Since Equation (2.4) does not have
a closed-form solution, a simulation estimator is used to approximate the pre-
dicted market shares. First, pairs of (νi, Di), for i = 1, . . . , ns, are drawn from
Fns (i.e., a multinomial normal distribution and the distributions on demo-
graphics), which represent unobserved and observed consumer characteristics.
The simulated market shares are then computed according to Equation (2.6)
and Equation (2.7).
















for i = 1, . . . , ns, j = 1, . . . , Jt, t = 1, . . . , T
In BLP (1995), they show that under regular conditions, for any triple of
(s0t , θ2, F ), δt in Equation (2.5) can be solved recursively by iterating a con-
traction mapping operator until convergence is reached. A series of {δnt }Nn=1







t , θ2, Fns)) . Then δt is approximated by δ
N
t , where N is the smallest
integer such that ‖δNt − δN−1t ‖ is smaller than some defined tolerance level.
Step 2 : Given θ2 and δ(θ2) =
(




, an error term is defined
as e(θ) = δ(θ2)−X1θ1. Then interact the error term with the instruments and
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the weighting matrix to construct the GMM objective function, i.e.,
q = e(θ)′ZWZ ′e(θ) (2.8)
Step 3 : Search for θ2 to minimize Equation (2.8). Note that since e(θ)
is linear in θ1, given θ2 and δ, the value of θ1 which minimizes q can be solved






Therefore, searching for the demand-side parameters can be reduced to the
search for θ2 only.
Step 4 : Recover the taste coefficients, β, by a GLS regression, i.e., by
regressing ρ̂, the estimated coefficients on the product-specific dummies, on
X, the observed product characteristics, using a weighting matrix V −1ρ , which
is inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of ρ̂. The GLS regression model is
ρ = Xβ + ξ (2.10)
Assuming E[ξ|X] = 0, the GLS estimator for β is
β̂ = (X ′V −1ρ X)
−1X ′V −1ρ ρ̂ (2.11)
2.5 Estimation Results
2.5.1 Descriptive statistics of the data
Table 2.4 reports the average quantities, retail prices, AAC’s, and retail
profits for each product over the before and the after SB entry sample periods.
Regarding quantities, after the entry of SB’s, except for Product 2, the quan-
tities of all other NB’s decreased. Note that the increased sales of SB’s are less
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than the decreased sales of NB’s. Therefore, it seems that introducing SB’s
only induced consumers who used to buy the incumbent NB’s in this product
category to switch to the SB’s, but did not expand the total category sales
by attracting new consumers into the market. Regarding retail prices, after
the entry of SB’s, retail prices of the 4 imitated NB’s all decreased and those
of the 3 non-imitated NB’s all increased. AAC’s displayed the same pattern,
except for Product 1. If the retailer’s marginal costs consist of only wholesale
prices and if wholesale prices can be approximated by AAC’s, then the changes
in retail prices could be driven by the changes in wholesale prices. A possi-
ble explanation for the cost-side adjustments may be that since SB’s compete
directly and thus steal most of business from their imitated NB’s (which are
the leading brands in this product category), the manufacturer of these imi-
tated NB’s (Quaker) may want to fight for market share by dropping wholesale
prices in the hope that the retailer will pass on the savings to consumers by
decreasing retail prices. However, it seems odd that the wholesale prices of
two of the non-imitated NB’s increased after SB entry and that of the third
one decreased just a bit. My guess is that even though the non-imitated NB’s
also lost business to SB’s, since they are not major players in this product
category (the ratio of sales of the non-imitated NB’s to sales of the imitated
NB’s before SB entry is about 1 to 6), the loss may be quite limited. Moreover,
the decrease in retail prices of the imitated NB’s had made the competition
even more severe. The manufacturer of the non-imitated NB’s (Nabisco) may
find that competing via price is not profitable. Therefore, instead, it adopts
a strategy of further differentiating their brands from the low-priced SB’s by
positioning them as the premium brands and maintaining a higher-price level.
Finally, no matter what the manufacturers’ pricing strategies are after SB en-
try, introducing SB’s into the market seems to have a positive impact on the
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retailer’s profitability since retail profits of NB’s all increased after the entry
of SB’s.
The bottom panel in Table 2.4 compares SB’s and their corresponding
imitated NB’s. The average retail prices of SB’s are about 76%-81% of those of
NB’s and the average sales are 18%-41%, which implies that even though SB’s
are less expensive and are “me-too” products to the imitated NB’s, some sort of
perceived quality differences do exist so that a large number of consumers are
willing to pay more for the imitated NB’s. Therefore, even though the retail
profits of SB’s are much higher than those of NB’s, which seems to suggest
that the retailer should raise the prices of NB’s to steal more business and thus
make more profits, the retailer need to consider the possibility that by doing
so, some consumers who are loyal to NB’s or who find the quality of SB’s
unacceptable may decide to buy nothing in this category, or worse, switch
to other retailers. Hence, it is important for retailers to know consumers’
demand elasticities so that their pricing decisions indeed achieve the goal of
profit maximization.
2.5.2 Results of the logit model
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results for the logit model. In the
standard logit specification, consumers are homogeneous, i.e., their taste pref-
erences are the same. Therefore, there are no random coefficients. This makes
the estimation very simple since the mean utility level, δjt, can be solved ana-
lytically, i.e., ln(s0jt)− ln(s00t). Columns (i) and (ii) shows the results of regress-
ing ln(s0jt)− ln(s00t) on retail price, summer, promotion, and the observed prod-
uct characteristics (Set A covariates) by OLS and 2SLS respectively. Columns
(iii) and (iv) shows the results of regressing ln(s0jt) − ln(s00t) on retail price,
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summer, promotion, and product-specific dummies (Set B covariates) by OLS
and 2SLS respectively.
Most of the estimated coefficients are of the expected sign. For example,
the negative coefficient on the seasonal dummy, “summer”, makes sense since
the product category is hot-breakfast cereals. The coefficient on “SB” is nega-
tive since SB products are usually perceived as of lower quality. The negative
coefficient on “big” implies consumers dislike products in large-size packages
and it is probably because they are harder to store or transport (Cohen 2004).
The negative coefficients on the constant and the product-specific dummies
may reflect the fact that the market shares of the inside goods are very small
relative to the market share of the outside good. Except for the coefficient
on instant/small-pack in the OLS regression, the coefficients on instant/small-
pack and on flavor are positive. The positive sign may be caused by consumers’
treating these two product characteristics as some sort of product innovation
or improvement which enhances utility. The coefficient on wheat/Nabisco is
negative, which is bad news for the manufacturer of Nabisco because it im-
plies that consumers do not regard Nabisco as a premium brand in this product
category. Finally, the coefficient on price is negative as expected.
Note that when Set A covariates are used as the regressors, the price
coefficient (in absolute value) estimated by OLS (denote as αOLS) is less than
that estimated by 2SLS (denote as α2SLS), but when Set B covariates are
used, the opposite occurs. When the regressors are Set A covariates, the error
term is ξj+Mξjt, but when regressors are Set B covariates, the error term is
Mξjt. Therefore, αOLS being greater than α2SLS using Set B covariates seems
to imply a negative correlation between Mξjt and prices, which causes the
upward bias of αOLS when the endogeneity of price is not accounted for. I
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am not sure how to explain the negative correlation between Mξjt and prices.
On the other hand, a positive correlation between ξj and prices seems more
intuitive. αOLS being less than α2SLS using Set A covariates may be due to
the positive correlation between ξj and prices which dominates the negative
correlation between Mξjt and prices, so that αOLS is downward biased when
the endogeneity of price is not accounted for.
Judging by the adjusted R2’s of OLS, it seems that including the
product-specific dummies improves the fit of the model. The J statistics of
2SLS look more worrisome. The over-identification test is rejected using either
Set A or B covariates, which suggests that the identification assumption, i.e.,
that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms, is not valid. How-
ever, Nevo (2001) comments that a χ2 test will reject essentially any model
with a large enough sample size. Since I have about 27,700 observations, which
should be counted as a large sample size, the failure of the over-identification
test may not be conclusive enough in rejecting the identification assumption.
In the logit model, product j’s own-price elasticity in market t is α(1−
sjt)pjt. I use α
2SLS with Set B covariates to compute the own-price elasticities.
Table 2.6 reports the medians of own-price elasticities for the before and after
SB entry periods. After the entry of SB’s, demand for both imitated and non-
imitated NB’s becomes more elastic and the percentage changes in own-price
elasticities are greater for the non-imitated NB’s than for the imitated ones.
Since the entry of SB’s provides consumers with more alternative options in
this product category, it seems reasonable to expect more elastic demand.
Even though the logit model has the advantage of being computation-
ally simple, the I.I.A. property results in restrictive and unrealistic substitu-
tion patterns. For example, when there is a change in price of, say, product
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j, the proportions of consumers who substitute away from product j to other
products are only based on the market shares of these products. Therefore,
cross-price elasticities in the logit model are not reported here. In fact, as
suggested by Nevo (2001), it seems that the own-price elasticity estimates of
a logit model can also be quite restrictive, since some of the products in Table
2.6 have own-price elasticities in the inelastic region.
2.5.3 Results of the random coefficients logit model
The random coefficients logit model (the full model) is described by
Equation (2.3) and the model parameters are estimated according to the pro-
cedure in Section 4.3. Table 2.7 reports the estimation results for the full
model. The results in the first column are consumers’ mean tastes for price
(α), observed product characteristics (β’s), summer (λ), and promotion (γ).
The results in the second, third, and fourth columns are the coefficients on
the interaction terms between price/observed product characteristics and un-
observed/observed individual characteristics (Σ and Π).
The signs of the mean tastes for product characteristics: “inst/small-
pack”, “big”, “flavor”, and “SB” seem to be counter intuitive based on the
arguments in Section 5.2. However, since the logarithm of household income
is never zero, the signs of the individual-specific tastes for these product char-
acteristics may change after accounting for the random coefficient effects. The
signs of the rest of the coefficients seem to make more sense. For example, the
coefficients on summer and promotion are, respectively, negative and positive;
price sensitivity decreases with income and in households with individuals un-
der 18; the marginal valuation for “inst/small-pack”, “flavor”, and “constant”
increases with income and in households with individuals under 18; marginal
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valuation for “big”, “wheat”, and “SB” decreases with income and with house-
hold with individuals under 18. One implication from the random-coefficients
results is that SB’s seems more likely to be favored by lower-income people.
Table 2.8 reports the median own-price elasticities and the 95% confi-
dence intervals for the full model, computed as follows. (i) I take 3000 random
draws from the estimated distribution of the parameters. (ii) Given the pa-
rameters from each draw, I compute the own-price elasticities for each product
at each market. (iii) I take medians for the before and after SB entry periods
and compute the percentage changes of the two medians for each product. (iv)
I order the simulated own-price elasticities for each product and construct the
lower and upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval by taking the values
in the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles.
Based on the point estimates, the own-price elasticities of NB’s all
increased after the entry of SB’s, but the increase is not significant for Products
4 and 5. In theory, SB entry can affect a NB’s demand elasticity in two
potential ways. On the one hand, since the entry of SB’s increases the number
of substitutes to the incumbents, demand should become more elastic (referred
to as the “substitute” effect). On the other hand, since SB’s have lower prices
than NB’s, if consumers who switch to the cheaper SB’s are price sensitive
consumers and those who keep purchasing the more expensive NB’s are brand-
loyal consumers, demand elasticities of the incumbent NB’s may decrease after
the entry of SB’s (referred to as the “loyalty” effect). Based on the above
arguments, the results in Table 2.8 suggest that the substitute effect weakly
dominates the loyalty effect. Moreover, similar to the results in the logit
model, demand elasticities of the non-imitated NB’s not only increased after
SB entry, they increased relatively more than those of the imitated NB’s,
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except for Product 7. A possible explanation is that after the entry of SB’s,
the non-imitated NB’s face not only more competition from the new entrants,
but more severe price competition from the imitated NB’s as well. Therefore,
even though SB’s are used to target mainly the market of the leading brands,
the non-imitated NB’s can be hurt even worse by SB entry, due to the way
the imitated NB manufacturer responds to the SB’s.
Table 2.9 presents the median own-price and cross-price elasticities be-
fore and after the entry of SB’s in the full model. One way to examine con-
sumers’ substitution patterns among these products is to compare the esti-
mates in Table 2.9 by rows. The non-imitated NB’s, Products 1-3, are most
sensitive to a change in the price of the imitated NB’s with similar product
characteristics, i.e., Products 4, 6 and 7 respectively. Three of the imitated
NB’s, Products 4-6, are most sensitive to a change in the price of the other
imitated NB’s, i.e., Products 7, 4 and 7 respectively. Only one of the imitated
NB’s, Product 7, is most sensitive to a change in the price of its imitating SB,
Product 11. As for the SB’s, Products 8-11, they are most sensitive to a change
in the price of their corresponding imitated NB’s, Products 4-7. The results
demonstrate the leading role of the imitated NB’s in this product category and
suggest why the imitated NB manufacturer has a stronger incentive to price
aggressively in response to SB’s than the non-imitated NB manufacturer.
Table 2.10 presents the medians of absolute change in market share
with respect to percentage change in price before and after the entry of SB’s
in the full model. Another way to examine consumers’ substitution patterns
in this product category is to compare the estimates in Table 2.10 by columns.
Increasing by 1% the price of the non-imitated NB’s, most consumers substi-
tute to the imitated NB’s with similar product characteristics. Increasing by
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1% the price of the imitated NB’s, most consumers substitute to the other
imitated NB’s, except for Product 7. Increasing by 1% the price of the SB’s,
most consumers substitute to their corresponding imitated NB’s. Therefore,
the substitution patters are very similar to the ones based on Table 2.9. In
general, substitution patterns for NB’s and SB’s are asymmetric, i.e. when
the prices of their favorite products increase, most NB buyers tend to substi-
tute to other NB products, but SB buyers will substitute to the corresponding
imitated NB’s. However, Product 7 seems to be an exception. A possible
explanation is that consumers may find that no other NB’s are a closer sub-
stitute to Product 7 than Product 11, or in terms of product characteristics
space, the “physical” product characteristic, “flavor”, dominates the “brand
image” product characteristic, “SB”. Therefore, when the price of Product 7
is increased, consumers are more likely to substitute to Product 11, the me-
too SB version of Product 7. This suggests that simply imitating a NB does
not necessarily make the imitating SB the closest substitute to the imitated
NB. There are other factors the retailers should take into account when they
introduce the “me-too” SB’s to target the leading NB’s market.
Finally, I examine how well the full model overcomes the restrictions
on the own-price and cross-price elasticities imposed by the logit model. First,
as pointed out by Nevo (2001), the problem with the own-price elasticities in
the standard logit model is that they are determined directly by the functional
form. For example, if the market shares of the inside goods are all fairly small
(as they are in my case), α(1− sjt) will be nearly constant. Then the ordering
of own-price elasticities, i.e., α(1 − sjt)pjt, will follow closely the ordering of
prices (Nevo, 2000). Table 2.11 shows that the median own-price elasticities in
the logit model have exactly the same order as the prices. As for the median
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own-price elasticities in the full model, even though in general, higher-price
products tend to have higher own-price elasticities and vice versa, the ordering
of own-price elasticities is no longer identical to the ordering of prices. Second,
in the logit model, when there is a change in the price of, say, product j, the
proportions of consumers who substitute from product j to the other products
are based on the market shares of these other products only, not on how close
they are to product j in the product space. This is the result of the I.I.A.
property and it implies that the cross-price elasticities in each column of the
own- and cross-price elasticity matrix will be the same. Note that the ratios of
the maximum to the minimum values of cross-price elasticities in each column
of Table 2.9 are at least 14. These variations suggest that the full model
does allow for more flexible substitution patterns. Therefore, the random-
coefficients logit model seems to do quite well at overcoming the restrictions
on the own- and cross-price elasticities imposed by the logit model.
2.5.4 Marginal costs
Given demand-side estimates, marginal costs can be backed out under
certain assumptions about retailers’ pricing behavior. I assume that marginal
costs are constant and exogenous and that the retailer chooses prices to maxi-
mize the category-level profits for each market. The profit-maximizing problem






(pjt −mcjt)sjt(pt), for t = 1, . . . , T
Here pt is a vector of retail prices of all products in the category; pjt, mcjt and
sjt are the retail price, marginal cost and market share of product j at market
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t; and Mt is the potential market size of market t.
The solution to the above retailer’s problem must satisfy Jt first order






= 0, for j = 1, . . . , Jt (2.12)
These first order conditions can be rewritten in a matrix form as Equation
(2.13).


































Given demand-side estimates, marginal costs can be backed out using Equation
(2.14).
mct = pt + Ω
−1
t st(pt), for t = 1, . . . , T (2.14)
Table 2.12 reports the average marginal costs (MC’s) backed-out from
the full model and the average acquisition costs (AAC’s) observed in the data
for the before and after SB entry periods. There are several explanations for
the discrepancy between MC’s and AAC’s. For example, a temporary whole-
sale price cut this period may only show in the AAC’s gradually as the old
higher-priced inventory carried by the retailer is being sold over the next few
periods. In this case, MC’s are less than AAC’s. On the other hand, if the
retailer forward-buys to build up inventory during a manufacturers’ trade pro-
motion, AAC’s will remain depressed for some time even after wholesale prices
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have gone back up (Chevalier et al, 2000). In this case, MC’s are greater than
AAC’s. In addition, the nature of AAC can cause the discrepancy between
MC’s and AAC’s as well. AAC is the average wholesale price of the item in
inventory. According to Chintagunta (2002), the wholesale prices reported
by the retailer in the data are prices net of promotional payments such as
off-invoice discounts and promotional moneys for feature advertisements and
special displays, but not net of other sorts of promotional funds which the
manufacturers could possibly make to the retailer. Therefore, if the manufac-
turers provide the retailer any of these “unobserved” promotional payments,
marginal costs will be lower than the reported wholesale prices (or AAC’s).
Moreover, besides wholesales prices, the retailer may incur other expenses for
specific operations such as shipping, storing, shelving, and pricing (Borin and
Farris, 1990). If the retailer incorporates these expenses into marginal costs,
MC’s will be greater than wholesale prices (or AAC’s).
Table 2.12 shows that almost all the ratios of MC’s to AAC’s of the NB’s
are less than 1, but those of the SB’s are all greater than 1. A slow turnover
of NB’s inventories might cause their MC’s to be less than the AAC’s and the
retailer’s stockpiling of SB’s during a trade promotion could cause their MC’s
to be greater than the AAC’s. However, according to Chevalier et al (2000),
DFF has good information on when a trade promotion is coming up and its
optimal inventory management will incorporate information about such trade
promotions relatively quickly into the AAC’s. Moreover, according to Berges-
Sennou et al (2003), due to the relative absence of barriers to entry in the food
industry, private labels are often assumed to be produced by a competitive
fringe composed of small firms. Therefore, in the literature, SB’s are often
assumed to be sold to retailers at marginal production costs, which implies that
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SB manufacturers are unlikely to be able to afford trade promotions. Another
explanation for NB’s MC’s being less than AAC’s is that NB manufacturers
may have made the retailer some sort of “unobserved” promotional payments
which induces the retailer’s extra support for their brands, but is not accounted
for in the retailer’s reported wholesale prices. On the other hand, since the
retailer is the sole party who owns and controls SB’s, all the expenses occurred
to develop, maintain and promote SB’s have to come out of the retailer’s own
pocket. This could be what causes SB’s MC’s to be greater than the AAC’s.
2.5.5 Consumer surplus
Since the data consist of two sample periods: one when there are no
SB’s in the market and the other when SB’s are available, using the demand-
side estimates, I simulate consumer surplus before and after SB entry to exam-
ine whether the entry of SB’s has a positive effect on consumer surplus. Note
that only expected value of consumer surplus can be measured because the
realization of the additive error term, εijt, in the utility function is unobserved
and thus needs to be integrated out. Moreover, since the data are market-
level data, only the average expected consumer surplus can be measured by
integrating over the expected consumer surplus of all consumers in a market.
Equation (2.15) is the average expected consumer surplus per unit demand
at market t. Equation (2.15) is approximated by Equation (2.16), i.e., the
integral is approximated by taking 1000 random draws (ns=1000) from the
distributions on demographics, P ∗(.). Equation (2.17) is the total expected
consumer surplus at market t, derived by multiplying average expected con-
sumer surplus by market size.
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∗(Di, νi), for t = 1, . . . , T
(2.15)
Where










uijt = δjt(xj, pjt, ξj,M ξjt; θ1) + µijt(xj, pjt, νi, Di; θ2) + εijt






ECSit, for t = 1, . . . , T (2.16)
TECSt = AECSt ×Mt, for t = 1, . . . , T (2.17)
Table 2.13 reports the means of average expected consumer surplus and
total expected consumer surplus across all markets for the before and after SB
entry periods. It is not too surprising that the average expected consumer
surplus per unit demand is so small (only a little more than 1 cent) since the
market share of the outside good is huge and the unit demand is defined as
one serving per week. The monetary increase in average expected consumer
surplus after SB entry seems trivial, but the percentage increase is pretty
significant: consumer surplus is raised by over 10%. If we look at the total
expected consumer surplus per market, after the entry of SB’s, the monetary
increase in consumer surplus is on average $55.66 per store per week, still not
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very impressive. However, if this estimate can be applied to all of the stores
owned by the supermarket chain (about 100 stores), the increase in consumer
surplus is about $5566 per week. Therefore, even though from an individual
consumer’s point of view, the entry of SB’s does not seem to improve their
welfare significantly, the aggregate benefit for the society as a whole can be
quite substantial.
2.6 Conclusion
I estimate consumer demand for both national and store brands in a
particular product category - hot-breakfast cereals - using scanner data from
a multi-store supermarket chain in a major metropolitan area in generalized-
method-of-moments estimation of a random-coefficients model. The empirical
findings are: (1) After the entry of SB’s, demand becomes more elastic for
non-imitated NB’s, and either more elastic or shows no change for imitated
NB’s; (2) in general, substitution patterns for NB’s and SB’s are asymmetric,
i.e. when the prices of their favorite products increase, most NB buyers tend
to substitute to other NB products, but SB buyers will substitute to the corre-
sponding imitated NB’s; (3) the increase in consumer surplus due to the entry
of SB’s is trivial for an individual consumer ($0.001/week assuming that con-
sumers have unit demand of one serving per week), but the aggregate benefit
could be quite substantial ($5566/week for the market under study).
In addition, I apply the demand-side estimates to the supply side, i.e.,
I back out the retailer’s marginal costs assuming the retailer has constant
and exogenous marginal costs and chooses prices to maximize category profits
for each store. I suggested some explanations for the observed discrepancy
between the estimated marginal costs and the observed average acquisition
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costs. The NB manufacturers might have provided the retailer with some
promotional payments not revealed in the retailer’s reported wholesale prices,
and the retailer might have incurred expenses other than the wholesale costs
in order to support and promote the SB’s. Therefore, maintaining a successful
SB program may require more resources from the retailers than simply paying
the low wholesale prices.
The current model ignores possible strategic behaviors of the players,
i.e., consumers, retailers, and manufacturers. For example, consumers may be
forward-looking and they may wait for lower prices and stock up during a sale,
which implies a dynamic demand model since consumers’ purchase decisions
will depend on current prices, their inventories, and their expectations of future
prices. Moreover, there may exist strategic interactions between retailers’ and
manufacturers’ pricing behaviors as well. These issues are certainly important
and interesting though addressing them is beyond the scope of this study and
is left for future research.
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Chapter 3
A Reduced-Form Examination of Consumer
Stockpiling Behavior in the Canned-Tuna
Product Category
3.1 Introduction
For many consumer packaged goods, a temporary price reduction (a sale
or price promotion) of a good usually causes a surge in demand for the good.
In general, a sales bump can be decomposed into three components: brand
switching, purchase incidence, and purchase quantity. If a good is storable,
the effects of purchase incidence and purchase quantity can be further decom-
posed into two components: a consumption effect if consumers’ consumption
is price elastic and a stockpiling effect if consumers stock up for future usage.
Composition of a sales bump may vary from good to good depending on factors
such as storability, necessity, perceived differentiation, and purchase frequency.
Hendel and Nevo (2002) find evidence of consumer inventory holding in the
product categories of laundry detergents, soft drinks, and yogurt, and the rel-
ative strength of the consumption and stockpiling effects due to sales differs
across the three product categories. Furthermore, using scanner data on laun-
dry detergents, they estimate a structural dynamic demand model taking into
account consumer stockpiling behavior and conclude that estimation derived
from a standard static demand model is misleading if dynamics are present,
but ignored (Hendel and Nevo, 2005).
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I am interested in estimating consumer demand in the canned tuna
product category. Since canned tuna is a storable good, when it is on sale,
consumers can build up their inventories for future consumption. However,
storability is only a necessary condition which enables stockpiling. When a
good is non-staple, has low consumption frequency and is being promoted
frequently, it is likely that sales may mostly prompt consumers to purchase
for current consumption only. In other words, most consumers may decide
not to stock up during sales to avoid storage cost. The question posed here
then is whether consumer demand for canned tuna should be modeled by a
dynamic model or a static one. On the one hand, estimating a dynamic model
is computationally much more demanding compared to a static model. On
the other hand, estimated price elasticities in a static model can be biased
if dynamic motives are present, but ignored. I examine the data (including
both household-level purchase data and store-level aggregate data) and run
some reduced-form tests to investigate the significance of consumer inventory
holding in the canned-tuna product category. The results suggest that only a
limited amount of stockpiling exists in this product category. Therefore, the
potential bias in the price elasticities estimated using a static demand model
should not be a major concern.
3.2 Data
The data set I am using is known as “ERIM” provided by the James M.
Kilts Center, GSB, University of Chicago. The ERIM data set was collected
by the now-defunct ERIM division of A.C. Nielsen. It contains household-
level purchase data on 9 packaged-good product categories in two mid-sized
mid-western cities, Sioux Falls, SD and Springfield, MO. According to the
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data provider, these two cities are demographically typical of the U.S. pop-
ulation as a whole. Households who participated in the ERIM study were
issued with magnetic ID cards. When they presented their ID cards at the
checkout counters in the participating stores, their purchases of any UPC’s
in those 9 product categories were recorded. The total sales of the partici-
pating stores accounted for 80% of the market in terms of grocery and drug
retail sales. Each record in the household-level data is a purchase occasion
which records who made the purchase (household id), when (week) and where
(store) the purchase occurred, the UPC and quantity being purchased, and
the total payment made for the purchase. Moreover, when households joined
the ERIM study, they were asked to fill out a questionnaire. Therefore, basic
demographic information is available. In addition to household-level purchase
data, ERIM also contains store-level aggregate data with information about
total revenues, total quantities, feature advertisements, and in-store displays
for each UPC in the 9 product categories on a weekly basis.
The product category studied here is canned tuna. I use both household-
and store-level data in the city of Springfield, MO. The sample period is from
January 1985 to May 1987 (123 weeks). 21 stores associated with 4 supermar-
ket chains participated in the ERIM study in this market. The household-level
data consist of 58,920 purchase occasions made by 5,255 households during the
sample period. There are 5 package sizes in the canned-tuna product category:
3.25 oz, 6.5 oz, 9.25 oz, 12.5 oz, and 3-pack-3.25 oz. Table 3.1 presents the
market share, purchase occasion share, and non-price promotion (i.e., feature
advertisements and in-store displays) share of each package size. It shows
that the 6.5 oz package size is dominant in terms of both store sales (89.6%)
and household purchases (91.4%). Furthermore, Table 3.2 indicates that a
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handful of UPC’s account for the majority of sales in this product category.
They are 6.5-oz light tuna in water/oil of StarKist, Chicken of the Sea (CKN),
Three Diamond, and private label (PL). The table shows the market, purchase-
occasion, and non-price promotion shares and average shelf prices for these 4
brands. These UPC’s have a collective market share of more than 79% and
account for at least 81% of the households’ purchase occasions and 95% of
the participating stores’ non-price promotional activities. Since consumers are
likely to incur some storage cost for keeping inventories, it seems reasonable to
assume that consumers do not stockpile when purchasing at regular (non-sale)
prices. In other words, only when a good is on sale may the monetary sav-
ing give consumers incentives to stock up for future use. Therefore, frequent
temporary price reductions are important in order to identify consumer stock-
piling behavior. Note that except for the top sellers listed above, the prices
of all other UPC’s of canned tuna vary very little and their market shares are
very small. Since the purpose is to investigate consumer stockpiling in the
canned-tuna product category, I thus restrict the analyses to these top selling
UPC’s.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
The store-level data provide information about each participating store’s
weekly total quantities, total revenues, and feature/dispaly activities for each
UPC. I use the quantity and revenue variables to compute shelf prices for each
brand-store-week combination. There are 4 brands, 21 stores, and 123 weeks.
After excluding missing data, there are 9,407 brand-store-week observations.
In general, retail prices, especially for StarKist and CKN, exhibit a certain
pattern over time, i.e., the prices remain constant at a “regular” price for a
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relatively longer period of time and drop occasionally to a “sale” price for a
shorter period. Figure 3.1 is an example of the retail price patterns of StarKist
and CKN over the sample period in one participating store. Even though the
kind of price patterns just described can be easily observed in the figure, it is
harder to pinpoint the regular and sale prices. I follow one approach in Hendel
and Nevo (2002), by which regular price is defined as the modal price over the
sample period. I then define a brand to be on sale if its shelf price is at least
20% below its regular price. Table 3.3 presents the relation between aggregate
demand and retail price discount. The table shows that boosts of sales due to
price promotions are quite spectacular: about 78% of the quantity was sold
during the sale weeks which accounted for about 25% of the time.
I also compare households’ sale and non-sale purchase quantities. The
sample consists of 1,781 households (who purchased only the 4 brands un-
der study during the sample period) and 12,579 purchases. The lower panel
of Table 3.4 shows that 79.7% of the purchase occasions occurred when the
purchased brand was on sale. Therefore, it seems that price promotions are
quite effective in inducing households to make a purchase. The upper panel of
Table 3.4 reports the distributions of households’ sale and non-sale purchase
quantities. It seems that purchase quantity is more likely to be higher for a
sale purchase. The percentage of non-sale purchases such that the quantity
being purchased is no more than 4 cans is 99.1%, and 97.8% for sale purchases.
Therefore, even though it is hard to say whether the increased quantities pur-
chased during sales are used for current or future consumption, at least it
shows that not many households stockpile a large number of cans during sales.
Table 3.5 presents the distribution of number of purchases for the 1,781
households and the distribution of purchase quantities for the 12,579 purchase
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occasions. The left panel of Table 3.4 shows that at least 50% of the households
made no more than 5 purchases and less than 10% more than 15 during the
sample period of 123 weeks. The right panel of Table 3.4 shows that less than
2% of the purchases involved a purchase quantity more than 4. Therefore,
it seems that both purchase frequency and consumption of canned tuna are
typically low.
Table 3.6 presents the averages of sale purchase ratio, purchase dura-
tion, and purchase quantity across households with the same purchase fre-
quency. Column 4 (“Duration”) shows that the lower the purchase frequency,
the longer the average purchase duration, which is as expected if consump-
tion of canned tuna is not serial correlated. Column 5 (“Quantity”) shows
that there is no clear correlation between purchase frequency and purchase
quantity. Note that once opened, canned tuna becomes perishable and will
be spoiled in a few days. Therefore, consumers are likely to consume canned
tuna on a whole-can basis. In that sense, the small difference in the weekly
purchase quantities among the households with different purchase frequencies
may seem quite insignificant. Column 3 (“Ratio”) shows that sales purchase
ratios are generally very high for all the households, i.e., a household’s pur-
chases of canned tuna consist of mostly sales purchases regardless of his/her
purchase frequency.
The descriptive statistics in this section suggest that most households
are light and infrequent users of canned tuna and they made most of their
purchases during sales. Therefore, it is possible that for most consumers price
promotions of canned tuna only induce them to purchase for current con-
sumption, but not much stock up for future use. In the next section, some
reduced-form tests are provided to further investigate evidence of consumer
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stockpiling of canned tuna.
3.4 Reduced-Form Tests
The data directly observed by researchers only reveal consumers’ pur-
chase decisions, i.e., what and how many they buy. Since consumers’ con-
sumptions are not observable, so are their inventory levels. Therefore, even
though researchers do observe that consumers purchase more during sales, it
is not straightforward to separate a stockpiling effect from a consumption ef-
fect. Hendel and Nevo (2002) develop a dynamic model of consumer demand,
and from that model they derive several predictions on the observed variables
(regarding both household-level purchase patterns and store-level demand pat-
terns) when consumer stockpiling behavior is present. Therefore, reduced-form
tests based on those predictions may help to distinguish a dynamic model
where both consumption and stockpiling effects are present during sales from
a static one where only a consumption effect exists. The followings are their
proposed testable predictions.
• Prediction 1 : Duration to next purchase is longer for a sale purchase
than a non-sale purchase.
• Prediction 2 : Duration from previous purchase is shorter for a sale pur-
chase than a non-sale purchase.
• Prediction 3 : The probability that the previous purchase is non-sale is
higher conditional on a non-sale purchase than a sale purchase.
• Prediction 4 : Aggregate demand increases in duration since last sale.
The duration effects are present during both sale and non-sale periods,
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but stronger during the former.
In Hendel and Nevo’s (2002) model of consumer inventory holding, a
consumer’s purchase decision follows a S-s type rule. s denotes the inventory
level that triggers a purchase, which decreases in current price. Given that a
purchase is made, S denotes the target inventory level, which also decreases in
current price. According to the S-s decision rule, first, since a sale purchase
results in a higher end of period inventory than a non-sale purchase, all else
equal, the duration to the next purchase should be longer for a sale purchase;
thus Prediction 1. Second, since a non-sale purchase is triggered by a lower
beginning of period inventory than a sale purchase, on average, the duration
from the previous purchase should be longer for a non-sale purchase; thus
Prediction 2. Moreover, a lower inventory level triggers purchases at non-sale
prices, which is more likely to occur if the previous purchase is non-sale; thus
Prediction 3. Finally, since inventory decreases over time, demand should
increase in duration from the previous sale. In addition, since the target
inventory level is higher at sale prices than non-sale prices, the duration effect
is stronger for the sale periods than the non sale periods.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.7 present the average durations of sale and
non-sale purchases to next purchase, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 present
the average durations of sale and non-sale purchases from previous purchase,
respectively. They are averages taken across purchases made by the house-
holds in the “household sample”. The size of “household sample” is reduced
gradually by excluding households with lower purchase frequencies. If con-
sumers stockpile during sales, Column 1 should be greater than Column 2 and
Column 4 should be smaller than Column 5. According to Column 3, the
data are consistent with Prediction 1, i.e., duration to next purchase is longer
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for a sale purchase than a non-sale purchase. However, Column 6 shows that
duration from previous purchase is longer for a sale purchase as well, which
contradicts Prediction 2. The lower panel of Table 3.7 presents the within
differences in duration to next and from previous purchases between sale and
non-sale purchases, averaged out across the sample households. The results
also show that durations to next purchase and from previous purchase are
both longer for a sale purchase.
Columns 3 and 6 in Table 3.8 present the proportions of previous pur-
chases being non-sale conditional on current purchases being sale and non-sale,
respectively. Since Column 6 is greater than Column 3, the data are consistent
with Prediction 3, i.e., previous purchases are more likely to be non-sale condi-
tional on current purchases being non-sale. However, the lower panel of Table
3.8 shows that the within difference is positive, which contradicts Prediction
3.
Table 3.9 presents the regression results for duration effects on aggre-
gate demand. This is a regression of log of quantity on log of price, duration
since last sale, feature, display, Lent, store and brand dummies. The left panel
of Table 3.9 shows that the coefficient on the duration variable is insignificant
when sale and non-sale periods are pooled together in the regression. When
I allow the duration effect during the sale periods to be different from that
during the non-sale periods, the right panel of Table 3.9 shows that while the
coefficient on duration since last sale is positive and significant during the sale
periods, it is negative and insignificant during the non-sale periods. There-
fore, the data are not entirely consistent with Prediction 4 which states that
duration effects are present during both sale and non-sale periods.
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Note that Hendel and Nevo’s (2002) inventory model assumes that there
is only one brand, i.e., brand choice is abstracted from the problem. However,
in the data consumers do make brand choice since the product category con-
sists of multiple brands. Suppose that there are two types of consumers in the
sample: “brand-loyal” consumers and “switchers”. The former only purchase
a particular brand and the latter purchase whatever on sale. It is expected
that “brand-loyal” consumers will stockpile their favorite brands during sales
and thus display the kind of asymmetric duration patterns between sale and
non-sale purchases as predicted by Hendel and Nevo’s model. Judging from
the descriptive statistics, it is likely that the frequency of sales (of any brand)
is more often than that of consumption (of a typical consumer). In that case,
there is no need for “switchers” to stockpile, and they only make sale purchases
with symmetric purchase durations. If, say, “switchers” tend to have longer
purchase durations than “brand-loyal” consumers, the data’s being consistent
with Prediction 1, but contrary to Prediction 2 may result from lumping pur-
chases of both types of consumers together. One possible way to detect this
problem is to run the reduced-form tests on a chain basis. Table 3.10 presents
the frequencies of at least one brand on sale for each chain. Because there is
variation in frequency of sales across chains, if consumer stockpiling behav-
ior is present, the test results from the chains with lower frequencies of sales
is more likely to be consistent with the predictions since the inventory effect
should be stronger there. Tables 3.11 to 3.13 present the store-level statistics
for the reduced-form tests.
Table 3.11 shows that for chains 1 to 3, both durations to the next
purchase and from the previous purchase are longer for a sale purchase than a
non-sale purchase, i.e., the chain-level test results are consistent with Predic-
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tion 1, but contradict Prediction 2, as before. As for chain 4, the results are
consistent with both Predictions 1 and 2. However, it is not very convincing
evidence of consumer stockpiling since chain 4 is actually the one chain with
the most frequent sales of canned tuna. Table 3.12 shows that the chain-level
tests for Prediction 3 are consistent with the prediction, as before. It should be
expected since “switchers” make no non-sale purchases, i.e., the test statistics
are based only on purchases by “brand-loyal” consumers. Finally, Table 3.13
shows that using a 5% significance level, (i) for chain 1, the duration effect is
positive and significant during the sale periods, and positive and insignificant
during the non-sale periods; (ii) for chain 2, the duration effect is positive
and significant during both sale and non-sale periods;(iii) for chain 3, the du-
ration effect is positive and significant during the sale periods, and negative
and significant during the non-sale periods; and (iv) for chain 4, the duration
effect is positive and insignificant during both sale periods and non-sale pe-
riods. Therefore, only the test result from chain 2 is entirely consistent with
Prediction 4. However, since chains 1 and 3 have lower frequencies of sales
than chain 2, we would expect the duration effects in chains 1 and 3 during
the non-sale periods to be positive and significant as well.
According to the results of the above (non-chain-based and chain-based)
reduced-form tests , there does not seem to be strong consumer stockpiling
in the canned-tuna product category. Even though we cannot claim that
no households stockpile canned tuna during sales, it is likely that the inven-
tory effect is quite small and not very important in this product category (or
“switchers” outnumber “brand-loyal” consumers).
80
3.5 Duration Model
In this section, I apply the data on household purchases to a duration
model to study households’ inter-purchase times of canned tuna. According
to Jain and Vilcassim (1991), households’ decisions about purchase timing
may depend on marketing variables (such as price promotions, coupon offers,
feature advertisements, and point of purchase displays), household character-
istics, and the elapsed time since last purchase. To adjust for these factors’
effects on the probability distribution of inter-purchase times, I use a propor-
tional hazard function to analyze the duration data. The proportional hazard
function has the form described by Equation (3.1).
h(t|X) = λ(t) · ψ(X) (3.1)
λ(t) is the baseline hazard function which captures the effect of the
elapsed time since last purchase. The parametric form of the baseline hazard
function chosen is the expo-power (EP) hazard function which is very flexible
in displaying a wide variety of shapes. The p.d.f. is
λ(t) = γαtα−1 exp(θtα), γ > 0, α > 0 (3.2)
γ, α, and θ are the parameters of the EP hazard function. Under alternative
values of these parameters, the shape of the baseline hazard function can be
flat, monotonically increasing, monotonically decreasing, U shaped or inverted
U shaped.
ψ(X) is a function of the covariates which shifts the hazard from its
baseline. The parametric form of this function is
ψ(X) = exp(Xβ) (3.3)
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The covariates, X, are a dummy variable indicating whether there is a sale
when the purchase was made, a dummy variable indicating whether there is
a feature advertisement when the purchase was made, a dummy variable in-
dicating whether there is an in-store display when the purchase was made,
a dummy variable indicating whether previous purchase is a sale purchase,
household size, and log of household income. Note that consumer heterogene-
ity is accounted for through the observed household demographics only, i.e., I
assume that unobserved household characteristics have no effects on the haz-
ard rate. Moreover, I treat each spell of the inter-purchase times in the data
as independent so that estimating this model is simple and fast.
Table 3.14 presents the estimation results of the proportional hazard
model. Figure 3.2 displays the shape of the baseline hazard function. It is
inverted U-shaped which implies that initially consumers are more likely to
purchase canned tuna with the passage of time, but after a while without
making any purchase, they eventually become less likely to do so. Regarding
the estimated coefficients on the covariates, feature has a positive effect on
the hazard rate, but is insignificant; the effects of display and household in-
come on the hazard rate change from positive to negative and significant to
insignificant as households with lower purchase frequencies are removed from
the sample; and household size has a positive and significant effect on the
hazard rate. Moreover, the covariate, previous purchase being a sale purchase,
has a negative and significant effect on the hazard rate, which means that if a
previous purchase is made during a sale period, then the inter-purchase time is
expected to be longer. This seems to suggest consumer stockpiling behavior.
However, the covariate, presence of a sale when the purchase is made, has a
negative and significant effect on the hazard rate, which implies that price
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promotions decrease households’ purchase probabilities. This does not make
much sense and could be caused by the nature of the reduced-form specifi-
cation. According to the descriptive statistics in Table 3.7, both durations
from previous purchase and to next purchase are longer for a sale purchase
than for a non-sale purchase. It is probably why when the duration data are
used to estimate the hazard function of the duration model, the coefficients on
the covariates of previous and current sale purchases are both negative, even
though we would expect price promotions to accelerate households’ purchase
timings and thus shorten their inter-purchase times.
3.6 Conclusion
The results of the reduced-form tests for consumer inventory holding
suggest that only a limited amount of stockpiling exists in the canned-tuna
product category. Judging from the high ratio of sale purchases, the small
amount of increased quantities of sale purchases, and the low purchase fre-
quencies of the majority of households in the sample (as shown in Table 3.15),
it is possible that most of the time, canned tuna are not on the households’
shopping lists when they go grocery shopping. It is after they have arrived at
a store and find canned tuna is on sale that they are prompted to purchase
for current consumption. Since the inventory effect is small and not very im-
portant in this product category, it may be all right to estimate consumer
demand for canned tuna using a static demand model under the assumption
that consumers do not stockpile. The computational complexity can be greatly





The MCMC Estimation Algotithm
Gibbs sampling as used in this paper consists of three layers, i.e. three
conditional posterior distributions from which the model parameters (i.e., θi’s,
Π, and Σθ) are drawn. The first layer is for θi, i = 1, . . . , N ; the conditional
posterior of θi depends only on data for household i, rather than for the entire
sample. The second and third layers are for Π and Σθ; their conditional
posteriors do not depend on the data directly, but only on the draws of θi’s,
which themselves depend on the data. The details on how draws are taken are
as follows.
1. Start with any initial values: θ0i ’s, Π
0, and Σ0θ.
2. For each i, i = 1, . . . , N , draw θ1i conditional on Π
0 and Σ0θ using the
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm which operates as follows:
(a) Draw a k × 1 vector υ0i from a standard normal density.





0υ0i . Here L
0 is the Choleski




−1and π is a scalar which determines
the size of each jump. Usually, smaller (larger) jumps result in more
(fewer) accepts, and thus the MH algorithm takes more (less) itera-
tions to converge and the series of draws are more (less) correlated
after convergence. The value of π is programmed to vary at each
iteration to achieve an acceptance rate of about 0.3.
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(c) Draw a variable u1i from a standard uniform density and calculate
the ratio F 1i :
F 1i =
L(yi|θ̃1i )φ(θ̃1i |Π0, Σ0θ)
L(yi|θ0i )φ(θ0i |Π0, Σ0θ)




3. Draw Π1 conditional on θ1i ’s and Σ
0
θ from its normal conditional posterior
which has the following form:
vec(Π1) ∼ N(vec(Φ1), Σ0θ ⊗ (D′D + I)−1)
where























Draws from the above multivariate normal distribution are obtained as
follows:
(a) Draw a kd× 1 vector υ0 from the standard normal density.
(b) Calculate the new draw Π1: vec(Π1) = vec(Φ1) + L0Πυ
0. Here L0Π is
the Choleski factor of (Σ0θ ⊗ (D′D + I)−1).
4. Draw Σ1θ conditional on θ
1
i ’s and Π
1 from its inverted Wishart conditional
posterior which has the following form:














Draws from the above inverted Wishart are obtained as follows:
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(a) Draw v1 k × 1 vectors from the standard normal density. Label
these draws by τ 0m,m = 1, . . . , v1.























Repeat the last three steps many times. Iterating through numerous
cycles of draws from the conditional posteriors eventually provides draws
from the joint posterior of Π, Σθ, and θi’s. The mean and standard
deviation of the draws retained after convergence has been achieved can
then be calculated to obtain the estimates and standard errors of the
parameters
When the variance σ2 of a normal distribution is unknown, it is often
assumed that the prior of σ2 is inverted gamma distribution. If X is inverted
gamma distributed with degrees of freedom v and scale s, its probability den-




where c is a normalizing constant. The reasons for choosing the inverted
gamma are (i) its density is zero for any negative value of σ2, reflecting the
fact a variance must be positive and (ii) under the inverted gamma prior, the
posterior of σ2 is also inverted gamma. An inverted Wishart distribution is






Table 1.1: Shares of different package sizes  
package size market share purchase occasion share feature/display share 
3.25 oz 0.22% 0.18% 0.13% 
6.5 oz 89.58% 91.40% 99.48% 
9.25 oz 4.45% 3.82% 0.39% 
12.5 oz 4.20% 2.97% 0.00% 
3-pack-3.25 oz 1.55% 1.63% 0.00% 
total 100% 100% 100% 
Note: 1. “market share” is the quantity (measured by oz) sold of a particular package size over the total quantity sold of 
the whole product category. 2. “purchase occasion share” is the number of purchase occasions of a particular package 
size over the total number of purchase occasions. 3. “feature/display share” is the number of weeks of a particular 





Table 1.2: Shares and prices of the dominant brands      
brand market share  purchase occasion share feature/display share avg shelf price 
1: StarKist 42.17% 45.28% 56.94% 0.72 
2: CKN 26.42% 26.19% 26.66% 0.78 
3: 3 Diamond 2.18% 2.75% 6.39% 0.75 
4: PL 8.37% 7.37% 5.96% 0.67 
total 79.15% 81.59% 95.95%  







Table 1.3: Frequencies of sales of a brand  
On Sale Chain StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL 
disc >= 20% Chain 1 24.39% 8.94% 0.00% 15.09% 
  Chain 2 37.36% 31.32% 0.00% 0.89% 
  Chain 3 35.77% 18.21% 8.13% 0.81% 
  Chain 4 70.73% 71.34% 21.65% 10.06% 
disc >= 30% Chain 1 7.32% 8.67% 0.00% 14.54% 
  Chain 2 13.42% 8.50% 0.00% 0.00% 
  Chain 3 29.59% 16.26% 4.07% 0.00% 
  Chain 4 44.51% 51.83% 0.00% 0.00% 
disc >= 40% Chain 1 3.79% 5.15% 0.00% 2.35% 
  Chain 2 7.16% 2.46% 0.00% 0.00% 
  Chain 3 29.43% 12.68% 4.07% 0.00% 
  Chain 4 14.63% 24.70% 0.00% 0.00% 
                   Note: A brand is defined to be on sale if %d
regular






Table 1.4: Frequencies of the number of brands on sale  
Sales Chain no brand 1 brand 2 brands 3 brands 4 brands 
disc>=20% Chain 1 57.72% 36.31% 5.78% 0.18% 0.00% 
  Chain 2 45.41% 39.60% 14.99% 0.00% 0.00% 
  Chain 3 52.20% 33.50% 13.50% 0.81% 0.00% 
  Chain 4 1.83% 34.76% 51.83% 10.98% 0.61% 
disc>=30% Chain 1 74.71% 20.23% 4.88% 0.18% 0.00% 
  Chain 2 78.75% 20.58% 0.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
  Chain 3 62.60% 25.69% 10.89% 0.81% 0.00% 
  Chain 4 28.05% 47.56% 24.39% 0.00% 0.00% 
disc>=40% Chain 1 89.07% 10.66% 0.18% 0.09% 0.00% 
  Chain 2 91.05% 8.28% 0.67% 0.00% 0.00% 
  Chain 3 66.34% 21.95% 10.89% 0.81% 0.00% 





Table 1.5: The MCMC estimates of the population-level parameters  
  Π   θΣ  
 constant income size  
StarKist  3.70710**  0.55210  0.22897  0.12875**  
  (1.27206) (0.61372) (0.17600) (0.02705) 
CKN  3.34931**  0.59425  0.24154  0.12078**  
  (1.27926) (0.61521)  (0.17530) (0.02900) 
3 Diamond  2.90502**  0.39606  0.18709  0.53709**  
  (1.30152) (0.60893) (0.18160) (0.16570) 
Private Label 2.68617**  0.42876  0.20891  0.50156**  
  (1.29626) (0.61165) (0.17601) (0.10804) 
No Purchase  5.19037**  0.75619  0.10827  0.20870**  
  (1.26780) (0.60572) (0.17990) (0.04209) 
Price -2.64889** 0.27691**  -0.05549 0.18070**  
  (0.21832) (0.07134) (0.03765) (0.03033) 
Advertising 1.10652**  -0.10217** -0.04004 0.16352**  
  (0.17815) (0.05835) (0.03249) (0.03157) 
Lapse 0.06511**  -0.01249** 0.00274  0.00023  
  (0.01771) (0.00669) (0.00320) (0.00017) 
Lapse2 -0.00116** 0.00019  -0.00003 0.00000  
  (0.00038) (0.00014) (0.00006) (0.00000) 
Alpha* -1.93368** -0.12656 -0.01063 0.50265**  
  (0.40801) (0.15018) (0.06747) (0.10601) 
Rho* -0.01109 -0.21276** 0.07076  0.50957**  
  (0.39637) (0.12617) (0.07234) (0.21466) 
Note: 1. A double asterisk indicates that the estimates are statistically significant at a 10% level.  
2. Standard error is in the parenthesis.
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Table 1.6: Proportions of consumer heterogeneity  
explained by the demographic variables 
Individual-level parameter 
2λ  
1γ  (StarKist)  66.85% 
2γ  (CKN) 70.32% 
3γ  (3 Diamond)  34.45% 
4γ  (Private Label) 36.54% 
0γ  (No Purchase)  57.39% 
Pγ  (Price) 16.63% 
Aγ  (Advertising) 6.32% 
1β  (Lapse) 36.25% 
2β  (Lapse
2) 30.00% 
α  3.66% 







Table 1.7: The own- and cross-price elasticities of each brand  
and the elasticities of no-purchase probability 
  StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL 
StarKist 
-3.3895 0.8294 0.0913 0.1570 
  
(0.9809) (0.4976) (0.0848) (0.1219) 
CKN 
1.5337 -4.2362 0.0922 0.1552 
  
(0.4951) (0.7745) (0.0785) (0.1164) 
3 Diamond 
1.2666 0.6892 -4.4174 0.1738 
  
(0.4351) (0.4173) (0.5103) (0.1405) 
Private Label 
1.4925 0.7940 0.1107 -4.4674 
  
(0.5418) (0.5077) (0.1111) (0.5344) 
No Purchase  
0.1089 0.0506 0.0061 0.0093 
  
(0.0619) (0.0411) (0.0066) (0.0073) 
Note: 1. The entry  in cell (i, j) gives the percentage change in brand i’s quantity (in the outside good’s probability) with 
respect to the percentage change in brand j’s price. 2. Standard error is in the parenthesis. 
 94 
Table 1.8: Sales bump decomposition and percentage changes in demand   
10% price discount StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL average 
Sales bump decomposition        
brand switching 24.46% 48.66% 51.16% 50.29% 43.64% 
purchase incidence 58.11% 41.02% 37.96% 34.63% 42.93% 
purchase quantity 17.43% 10.32% 10.88% 15.08% 13.43% 
Percentage demand change         
promoted brand 37.35% 57.03% 60.99% 61.53% 54.23% 
product category 18.63% 7.57% 0.91% 1.55% 7.16% 
20% price discount StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL average 
Sales bump decomposition        
brand switching 19.75% 44.31% 49.72% 48.04% 40.46% 
purchase incidence 62.61% 43.77% 37.55% 35.43% 44.84% 
purchase quantity 17.63% 11.92% 12.73% 16.53% 14.70% 
Percentage demand change         
promoted brand 86.97% 150.62% 175.49% 169.72% 145.70% 
product category 46.08% 21.69% 2.69% 4.47% 18.73% 
30% price discount StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL average 
Sales bump decomposition        
brand switching 15.68% 38.09% 47.75% 44.92% 36.61% 
purchase incidence 67.43% 48.34% 36.95% 36.96% 47.42% 
purchase quantity 16.89% 13.56% 15.30% 18.13% 15.97% 
Percentage demand change         
promoted brand 152.85% 283.80% 380.84% 354.21% 292.93% 
product category 85.10% 45.43% 6.07% 9.88% 36.62% 
40% price discount StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL average 
Sales bump decomposition        
brand switching 12.24% 31.26% 44.80% 40.77% 32.27% 
purchase incidence 71.97% 54.48% 37.64% 39.28% 50.84% 
purchase quantity 15.80% 14.26% 17.56% 19.95% 16.89% 
Percentage demand change         
promoted brand 240.73% 467.01% 766.71% 640.52% 528.74% 





50% price discount StarKist CKN 3 Diamond PL average 
Sales bump decomposition        
brand switching 9.44% 24.54% 40.31% 35.94% 27.56% 
purchase incidence 76.50% 61.31% 39.95% 43.13% 55.22% 
purchase quantity 14.06% 14.15% 19.74% 20.94% 17.22% 
Percentage demand change         
promoted brand 362.71% 724.58% 1406.39% 1085.70% 894.84% 






Table 1.9: Average estimated retailer marginal costs 
 
Retailer MC ($) Chain 1 Chain 2 Chain 3 Chain 4 
StarKist 0.46 0.41 0.27 0.44
  (0.100) (0.146) (0.218) (0.107)
CKN 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.42
  (0.122) (0.121) (0.164) (0.130)
3 Diamond 0.44 0.44 0.35 0.41
  (0.049) (0.038) (0.094) (0.062)
PL 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.33
  (0.092) (0.029) (0.053) (0.039)
Note: Standard error is in the parenthesis. 
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Table 1.10: Retailer pass-through for StarKist and CKN 
 
~ 20% retail price di scount   price promotion 
  none both  StarKist CKN 
Retail Price ($)       
StarKist 0.89 0.69 0.69 0.89 
CKN 0.89 0.69 0.89 0.69 
Wholesale Price ($)         
StarKist 0.54 0.38 0.39 0.54 
CKN 0.54 0.38 0.53 0.39 
Retailer Pass-through       
StarKist  124.6% 127.2%  
CKN  125.2%  130.4% 
~ 30% retail price discount   price promotion 
  none both  StarKist CKN 
Retail Price ($)       
StarKist 0.89 0.59 0.59 0.89 
CKN 0.89 0.59 0.89 0.59 
Wholesale Price ($)         
StarKist 0.54 0.30 0.31 0.53 
CKN 0.54 0.30 0.53 0.31 
Retailer Pass-through       
StarKist  123.1% 125.5%  
CKN  123.8%  128.6% 
~ 40% retail price discount   price promotion 
  none both  StarKist CKN 
Retail Price ($)       
StarKist 0.89 0.49 0.49 0.89 
CKN 0.89 0.49 0.89 0.49 
Wholesale Price ($)         
StarKist 0.54 0.21 0.22 0.52 
CKN 0.54 0.21 0.51 0.23 
Retailer Pass-through         
StarKist  121.1% 123.4%  
CKN  121.8%  126.4% 
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Scenario 2 Ratio 
0.49 0.82 0.82 31.40 18.55 30.03 33.18 90.51% 
0.50 0.83 0.84 30.23 17.87 28.79 32.20 89.40% 
0.51 0.85 0.85 29.11 17.22 27.54 31.26 88.12% 
0.52 0.86 0.86 28.04 16.60 26.30 30.35 86.66% 
0.53 0.87 0.88 27.01 16.00 25.05 29.47 85.02% 
0.54 0.88 0.89 26.03 15.43 23.81 28.63 83.18% 
0.55 0.90 0.90 25.09 14.88 22.57 27.81 81.14% 
0.56 0.91 0.91 24.19 14.36 21.32 27.03 78.89% 
0.57 0.92 0.93 23.33 13.86 20.08 26.27 76.43% 
0.58 0.93 0.94 22.51 13.38 18.83 25.54 73.74% 
0.59 0.95 0.95 21.72 12.92 17.59 24.83 70.82% 
0.60 0.96 0.96 20.96 12.48 16.34 24.15 67.67% 
0.61 0.97 0.98 20.23 12.05 15.10 23.50 64.26% 
0.62 0.98 0.99 19.54 11.65 13.85 22.86 60.61% 
0.63 1.00 1.00 18.87 11.26 12.61 22.25 56.68% 
0.64 1.01 1.01 18.23 10.89 11.37 21.66 52.49% 
 
  no sale sale-StarKist sale-CKN 
Retail Price-StarKist 0.89 0.69 0.89 
Retail Price- CKN 0.89 0.89 0.69 
Quantity-StarKist 25.42 57.10 16.68 
Quantity-CKN 15.47 9.04 41.62 
 Note: “Ratio” is calculated as “Profit– Scenario 1” over “Profit– Scenario 2”. 
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Table 1.12: Estimated losses from retailers’ cyclical pricing 
 
city Store # zip inc(mean) inc(std) ratio 
OAK LAWN 8 60453 10.8050 0.7483 68.26% 
RIVER GROVE 18 60171 10.6410 0.7296 72.62% 
PARK RIDGE 32 60068 11.2120 0.7305 77.38% 
NORTHBROOK 52 60062 11.3950 0.8604 73.43% 
CHICAGO 53 60662 10.6420 0.8629 80.02% 
CRYSTAL LAKE 59 60014 11.1620 0.6237 56.11% 
JOLIET 70 60435 10.7490 0.7235 61.83% 
NORTH RIVERSIDE 71 60546 10.9250 0.7529 75.91% 
CHICAGO 73 60629 10.6310 0.8173 70.37% 
DOWNERS GROVE 78 60516 11.2280 0.6241 60.11% 
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS 80 60005 10.9840 0.7762 62.16% 
LANSING 83 60438 10.8030 0.6783 62.79% 
EVANSTON 93 60202 10.9620 0.7564 79.47% 
CHICAGO 98 60638 10.7420 0.8073 72.81% 
CHICAGO 100 60608 10.2020 0.9323 81.10% 
MERRIONETTE PARK 102 60655 11.0390 0.6096 68.14% 
Note: 1. “inc(mean)” and “inc(std)” are the two estimated parameters of the lognormal distribution which household 
income is assumed to follow; household income is measured by dollars. 2. “ratio” is calculated as the ‘total data profit’ 
over the ‘total optimal profit’; see text in Section 1.8.  
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Table 2.1: List of UPCs in the demand system before aggregation 
  UPC description product weight (oz) serving 
1 1313000612 Nabisco Cream of Wheat 2.5 MIN 1 28 24 
2 1313000622 Nabisco Cream of Wheat 1 MIN 1 28 24 
3 1313006025 Nabisco Inst Wheat-Regular 2 12 12 
4 1313006057 Nabisco Inst Wheat-Variety 3 12.5 10 
5 3000001020 Quaker Old Fashioned Oats 4 18 13 
6 3000001040 Quaker Old Fashioned Oats 5 42 30 
7 3000001180 Quaker Quick Oats 4 18 13 
8 3000001200 Quaker Quick Oats 5 42 30 
9 3000001210 Quaker Inst Oats-Regular 6 12 12 
10 3000001190 Quaker Inst Oats-MP  7 15 10 
11 3000001240 Quaker Inst Oats-RS 7 13 10 
12 3000001340 Quaker Inst Oats-CINNA 7 12.5 10 
13 3000001380 Quaker Inst Oats-APPLE 7 12.5 10 
14 3000001460 Quaker Inst Oats-Variety 7 13.3 10 
15 3000001800 Quaker Inst Oats-PEACH 7 12.5 10 
16 3000001820 Quaker Inst Oats-STRAW 7 12.5 10 
17 3000001880 Quaker Inst Oats-FRUIT 7 12.5 10 
18 3828125073 Dominick Quick Oats 8 18 13 
19 3828125077 Dominick Quick Oats 9 42 30 
20 3828125081 Dominick Inst Oats-Regular 10 12 12 
21 3828125085 Dominick Inst Oats-MP 11 15 10 
22 3828125098 Dominick Inst Oats-Variety 11 13 10 
23 3828125105 Dominick Inst Oats-APPLE 11 12.3 10 
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Table 2.2: List of products in the demand system and  
their observed product characteristics 
product description const wheat/Nab inst/SP big flavor SB 
1 Nabisco Non-Inst Wheat  1 1 0 0 0 0 
2 Nabisco Inst Wheat-Regular 1 1 1 0 0 0 
3 Nabisco Inst Wheat-Flavored 1 1 1 0 1 0 
4 Quaker Non-Inst Oats 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 Quaker Non-Inst Oats- Big Tube 1 0 0 1 0 0 
6 Quaker Inst Oats-Regular 1 0 1 0 0 0 
7 Quaker Inst Oats-Flavored 1 0 1 0 1 0 
8 Dominick Non-Inst Oats 1 0 0 0 0 1 
9 Dominick Non-Inst Oats-Big Tube 1 0 0 1 0 1 
10 Dominick Inst Oats-Regular 1 0 1 0 0 1 






Table 2.3: List of stores and store-level demographics 




hhund18 hhsize avg 
traffic 
1 DOMINICKS    8 OAK LAWN 60453 10.81 0.75 27.9% 2.46 23208 
2 DOMINICKS   18 RIVER GROVE 60171 10.64 0.73 30.9% 2.44 21719 
3 DOMINICKS   32 PARK RIDGE 60068 11.21 0.73 33.6% 2.61 26841 
4 DOMINICKS   52 NORTHBROOK  60062 11.40 0.86 35.1% 2.63 18137 
5 DOMINICKS   53 CHICAGO  60662 10.64 0.86 34.6% 2.69 13734 
6 DOMINICKS   59 CRYSTAL LAKE  60014 11.16 0.62 46.6% 2.93 12584 
7 DOMINICKS   70 JOLIET  60435 10.75 0.72 32.6% 2.43 18562 
8 DOMINICKS   71 NORTH RIVERSIDE  60546 10.93 0.75 27.1% 2.34 20103 
9 DOMINICKS   73 CHICAGO  60629 10.63 0.82 52.5% 3.51 22452 
10 DOMINICKS   78 DOWNERS GROVE  60516 11.23 0.62 37.8% 2.73 16631 
11 DOMINICKS   80 ARLINGTON HEIGHTS  60005 10.98 0.78 26.3% 2.3 20085 
12 DOMINICKS   83 LANSING  60438 10.80 0.68 32.8% 2.49 20158 
13 DOMINICKS   93 EVANSTON  60202 10.96 0.76 30.2% 2.3 18634 
14 DOMINICKS   98 CHICAGO  60638 10.74 0.81 32.4% 2.69 24541 
15 DOMINICKS  100 CHICAGO  60608 10.20 0.93 49.1% 3.31 24074 
16 DOMINICKS  102 MERRIONETTE PARK  60655 11.04 0.61 35.5% 2.67 24463 
Note: 1. “mean” and “sigma” are the two estimated parameters of the lognormal distribution which household income 
is assumed to follow. 2. Household income is measured by dollars. 3. “avg traffic” is the weekly number of households 
visiting the store averaged over the sample period. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the data 
    quantity        retail profit   
  Before After change %C Before After change %C 
Product 1 466 336 -130 -27.89 20.42 23.48 3.06 14.98 
Product 2 134 145 11 8.53 20.31 22.45 2.13 10.51 
Product 3 76 50 -26 -34.09 20.64 22.88 2.24 10.87 
Product 4 1269 1057 -212 -16.7 18.86 20.5 1.64 8.68 
Product 5 1226 1046 -180 -14.66 18.64 21.66 3.01 16.17 
Product 6 315 223 -91 -29.01 19.95 24.76 4.81 24.09 
Product 7 1235 935 -301 -24.34 20.3 23.47 3.17 15.62 
Product 8 — 184 — — — 55.84 — — 
Product 9 — 295 — — — 53.67 — — 
Product 10 — 91 — — — 52.21 — — 
Product 11 — 277 — — — 52.16 — — 
          price             aac    
  Before After change %C Before After change %C 
Product 1 11.74 11.97 0.24 2.02 9.29 9.15 -0.14 -1.47 
Product 2 22.11 23.78 1.67 7.57 17.52 18.41 0.9 5.11 
Product 3 26.62 28.52 1.91 7.16 21.01 21.95 0.94 4.48 
Product 4 13.67 12.5 -1.18 -8.6 10.98 9.88 -1.1 -10.06 
Product 5 10.38 9.51 -0.87 -8.39 8.39 7.43 -0.96 -11.39 
Product 6 22.29 22.22 -0.07 -0.33 17.62 16.66 -0.96 -5.45 
Product 7 26.73 26.61 -0.13 -0.48 21.03 20.3 -0.73 -3.47 
Product 8 — 9.62 — — — 4.12 — — 
Product 9 — 7.74 — — — 3.54 — — 
Product 10 — 16.88 — — — 7.82 — — 
Product 11 — 20.24 — — — 9.38 — — 
product   price     aac    profit     quantity   
  NB SB ratio NB SB ratio NB SB ratio NB SB ratio 
4 vs 8 12.5 9.62 0.77 9.88 4.12 0.42 20.5 55.84 2.72 1046 184 0.18 
5 vs 9 9.51 7.74 0.81 7.43 3.54 0.48 21.66 53.67 2.48 1464 295 0.2 
6 vs 10 22.22 16.88 0.76 16.66 7.82 0.47 24.76 52.21 2.11 223 91 0.41 
7 vs 11 26.61 20.24 0.76 20.3 9.38 0.46 23.47 52.16 2.22 935 277 0.3 
Note: 1. “quantity” is the average weekly number of servings sold. 2. “price” and “aac” are the average retail price and 
average aac per serving measured by cents. 3. “profit” is calculated by (price-acc)/price*100. 4. “change” is calculated 
by (After-Before) and “%C” is calculated by (change/Before*100). 5. “ratio” is calculated by (SB / NB).  
 102 
Table 2.5: Estimation results for the logit model 
Set A (i) (ii) Set B (iii) (iv) 
Covariate OLS 2SLS Covariate OLS 2SLS 
Price -11.636 -18.919 Price -8.882 -6.367 
  (0.2106) (0.5566)   (0.1844) (1.1189) 
Summer -0.452 -0.447 Summer -0.463 -0.465 
  (0.0092) (0.0094)   (0.0074) (0.0075) 
Promotion 0.418 0.239 Promotion 0.417 0.477 
  (0.0133) (0.0186)   (0.0108) (0.0284) 
Constant -2.245 -1.294 Product 1 -3.748 -4.049 
  (0.0292) (0.0734)   (0.0242) (0.1341) 
Wheat -1.441 -1.446 Product 2 -3.930 -4.509 
  (0.0098) (0.0100)   (0.0437) (0.2580) 
Inst/SP -0.084 0.619 Product 3 -4.343 -5.037 
  (0.0231) (0.0549)   (0.0519) (0.3090) 
Big -0.231 -0.405 Product 4 -2.696 -3.036 
  (0.0144) (0.0191)   (0.0269) (0.1517) 
Flavor 0.903 1.223 Product 5 -2.816 -3.069 
  (0.0144) (0.0269)   (0.0210) (0.1130) 
SB -2.070 -2.376 Product 6 -3.324 -3.892 
  (0.0143) (0.0261)   (0.0429) (0.2533) 
     Product 7 -1.613 -2.299 
       (0.0513) (0.3051) 
     Product 8 -4.986 -5.240 
       (0.0242) (0.1140) 
     Product 9 -4.592 -4.792 
       (0.0211) (0.0899) 
     Product 10 -5.052 -5.495 
       (0.0360) (0.1977) 
     Product 11 -3.614 -4.142 
       (0.0418) (0.2356) 
Adj R2 0.692 na Adj R2 0.803 na 
J na 819 J na 1451 




Table 2.6: Median own-price elasticities in the logit model 
  Before After Change %Change 
Product 1 0.675 0.7573 0.0823 12.1919 
Product 2 1.2897 1.5175 0.2278 17.661 
Product 3 1.5484 1.8228 0.2744 17.7194 
Product 4 0.772 0.797 0.0251 3.2467 
Product 5 0.5831 0.6013 0.0181 3.1123 
Product 6 1.3285 1.4505 0.122 9.1846 
Product 7 1.5617 1.7207 0.159 10.1813 
Product 8 — 0.651 — — 
Product 9 — 0.5001 — — 
Product 10 — 1.1488 — — 
Product 11 — 1.376 — — 




Table 2.7: Estimation results for the full model 
covariate mean std. dev. hhund18 logincome 
price -113.717* 2.174* 1.579 4.908* 
  (2.1250) (0.2925) (8.2903) (0.3834) 
constant -102.680* 2.437* 1.164 9.066* 
  (0.1647) (0.0696) (1.0608) (0.0472) 
wheat/Nab 30.375* 1.268* -2.185* -2.693* 
  (0.0278) (0.1445) (0.1557) (0.0116) 
inst/SP -28.616* 3.398* 0.818 2.442* 
  (0.1187) (0.0760) (0.8558) (0.0421) 
big 13.451* 1.792* -5.212* -1.180* 
  (0.0461) (0.2330) (1.8633) (0.0156) 
flavor -83.645* 2.825* 13.295* 6.433* 
  (0.0694) (0.1248) (2.2613) (0.1925) 
SB 34.804* 2.530* -1.861* -3.364* 
  (0.0584) (0.2669) (0.4124) (0.0314) 
summer -1.777* — — — 
  (0.0135) — — — 
promotion 0.167* — — — 
  (0.0267) — — — 
Note: 1. Product-, store-, and year- specific dummy variables are included as covariates in the regressions. 2. A single 
asterisk denotes that the estimates are significant at a 5% significance level. 3. Standard errors of the estimates are 
reported in the parentheses. 
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Table 2.8: Median own-price elasticities and 95% confidence intervals 
 in the full model 












[ 95% confidence 
interval ] 
Product 1 5.850 5.318 6.468 6.238 5.589 6.905 6.641 4.396 7.037 
Product 2 11.510 10.203 12.768 12.656 10.969 13.758 9.957 6.325 9.420 
Product 3 13.760 11.858 15.418 15.265 13.187 17.055 10.941 9.147 11.075 
Product 4 5.320 4.948 5.662 5.378 4.957 5.641 1.092 -1.997 1.908 
Product 5 3.750 3.310 4.463 3.792 3.334 4.446 1.123 -3.507 3.380 
Product 6 10.930 10.363 11.327 11.491 10.810 11.914 5.139 2.535 6.047 
Product 7 4.873 4.214 5.659 7.204 6.193 8.264 47.831 28.929 32.959 
Product 8 — — — 5.428 4.999 5.754 — — — 
Product 9 — — — 4.164 3.566 4.814 — — — 
Product 10 — — — 9.532 8.453 10.053 — — — 
Product 11 — — — 10.082 8.691 11.273 — — — 
Note: 1. Own-price elasticities are reported in absolute value. 2. “% Change” is calculated by (after-before)/before*100. 
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7     
Product 1 -5.8499 0.1333 0.0146 0.9607 0.6364 0.2024 0.1213     
Product 2 0.2594 -11.5098 0.0392 0.3875 0.4305 0.9198 0.3841     
Product 3 0.0392 0.0618 -13.7597 0.2726 0.0052 0.4163 8.0851     
Product 4 0.2978 0.0693 0.0331 -5.3201 0.4541 0.3448 0.9567     
Product 5 0.2525 0.0833 0.0008 0.5454 -3.7497 0.1760 0.0240     
Product 6 0.1605 0.3884 0.1059 0.8408 0.3508 -10.9297 1.4976     
Product 7 0.0208 0.0381 0.5212 0.5032 0.0100 0.2960 -4.8731     
outside  0.0306 0.0145 0.0032 0.0651 0.0657 0.0226 0.0456     
























Product 1 -6.2384 0.1530 0.0085 0.7160 0.5096 0.1256 0.0917 0.0630 0.0460 0.0289 0.0276 
Product 2 0.2081 -12.6558 0.0324 0.2634 0.3255 0.6412 0.3608 0.0298 0.0241 0.1576 0.0735 
Product 3 0.0332 0.0786 -15.2652 0.1789 0.0040 0.3502 6.4654 0.0039 0.0001 0.0089 0.9804 
Product4 0.2561 0.0743 0.0194 -5.3782 0.3296 0.2572 0.6071 0.0515 0.0160 0.0249 0.1452 
Product 5 0.1969 0.1011 0.0005 0.3491 -3.7918 0.1222 0.0182 0.0329 0.0781 0.0231 0.0030 
Product 6 0.1046 0.4534 0.0779 0.6630 0.2504 -11.4914 1.2371 0.0409 0.0132 0.1912 0.2525 
Product 7 0.0173 0.0495 0.3801 0.3302 0.0073 0.2295 -7.2039 0.0057 0.0002 0.0065 1.0330 
Product 8 0.1716 0.0559 0.0027 0.4106 0.2243 0.1274 0.1011 -5.4275 0.1568 0.0972 0.0762 
Product 9 0.0962 0.0376 0.0001 0.0841 0.4119 0.0335 0.0016 0.1109 -4.1643 0.0370 0.0023 
Product 10 0.0826 0.3291 0.0068 0.2050 0.1726 0.6596 0.1037 0.1110 0.0493 -9.5316 0.0795 
Product 11  0.0226 0.0422 0.2151 0.3090 0.0059 0.1939 4.0385 0.0220 0.0009 0.0226 -10.0816 
outside  0.0239 0.0148 0.0020 0.0465 0.0497 0.0159 0.0344 0.0083 0.0137 0.0061 0.0117 
variation 15 31 6574 15 127 41 4019 29 1562 31 446 
Note: 1. Let i be the index for row and j for column; the entry in cell (i, j) gives the percentage change in the market 
share of product i with respect to the percentage change in the price of product j. 2. “variation” is the ratio of the 
maximum value over the minimum value of cross-price elasticities in each column.    
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Table 2.10: Medians of absolute change in market share w.r.t.  
















7     
Product 1 -45.084 1.059 0.115 7.107 4.920 1.540 1.046     
Product 2 0.561 -26.033 0.090 0.870 0.844 2.047 0.838     
Product 3 0.051 0.075 -17.062 0.361 0.007 0.490 9.942     
Product 4 5.962 1.407 0.698 -101.596 9.341 6.492 18.964     
Product 5 5.590 1.788 0.018 12.468 -84.070 3.729 0.516     
Product 6 0.804 2.031 0.583 4.008 1.711 -52.921 7.929     
























Product 1 -35.257 0.872 0.050 3.883 2.748 0.695 0.594 0.345 0.244 0.160 0.147 
Product 2 0.438 -27.657 0.067 0.566 0.677 1.418 0.728 0.064 0.057 0.320 0.149 
Product 3 0.021 0.056 -11.109 0.129 0.003 0.202 4.663 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.651 
Product4 3.654 1.061 0.294 -69.837 4.536 3.547 8.951 0.814 0.242 0.365 2.222 
Product 5 3.456 1.686 0.008 6.084 -66.359 1.957 0.292 0.558 1.392 0.382 0.056 
Product 6 0.374 1.514 0.261 1.996 0.833 -36.621 4.150 0.131 0.045 0.653 0.783 
Product 7 0.266 0.658 5.085 4.242 0.104 3.479 -91.871 0.078 0.002 0.093 14.519 
Product8 0.428 0.161 0.007 1.045 0.558 0.302 0.218 -12.636 0.390 0.275 0.185 
Product 9 0.375 0.174 0.000 0.397 1.714 0.129 0.006 0.470 -17.551 0.156 0.009 
Product 10 0.113 0.456 0.009 0.275 0.226 0.849 0.142 0.154 0.072 -12.344 0.103 
Product 11  0.088 0.174 0.910 1.374 0.026 0.926 19.243 0.090 0.004 0.086 -38.699 
Note:  Let i be the index for row and j for column; the entry in cell (i, j) gives the change in the market share of product 
i (multiplied by 103 ) with respect to the percentage change in the price of product j. 
 108 
Table 2.11:  Average retail prices and own-price elasticities 
in the logit and full models  
    Before     After   
  price logit rcm  price logit  rcm  
Product 1 11.74 [6] 0.6750 [6] 5.8499 [4] 11.97 [8] 0.7573 [8] 6.2384 [7] 
Product 2 22.11 [4] 1.2897 [4] 11.5098 [2] 23.78 [3] 1.5175 [3] 12.6558 [2] 
Product 3 26.62 [2] 1.5484 [2] 13.7597 [1]  28.52 [1] 1.8228 [1] 15.2652 [1] 
Product 4 13.67 [5] 0.7720 [5] 5.3201 [5] 12.5 [7] 0.7970 [7] 5.3782 [9] 
Product 5 10.38 [7] 0.5831 [7] 3.7497 [7] 9.51 [10] 0.6013 [10] 3.7918 [11] 
Product 6 22.29 [3] 1.3285 [3] 10.9297 [3] 22.22 [4] 1.4505 [4] 11.4914 [3] 
Product 7 26.73 [1] 1.5617 [1] 4.8731 [6] 26.61 [2] 1.7207 [2] 7.2039 [6] 
Product 8 — — — 9.62 [9] 0.6510 [9] 5.4275 [8] 
Product 9 — — — 7.74 [11] 0.5001 [11] 4.1643 [10] 
Product 10 — — — 16.88 [6] 1.1488 [6] 9.5316 [5] 
Product 11 — — — 20.24 [5] 1.3760 [5] 10.0816 [4] 
Note: The numbers in the brackets denote the descending orders of the entries in each column. 
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Table 2.12: Estimated marginal costs and observed average acquisition costs 
  Before   After  
  aac   mc diff ratio aac    mc diff ratio 
product 1 9.29 7.64 -1.65 0.82 9.15 8.01 -1.14 0.88 
product 2 17.51 16.83 -0.68 0.96 18.41 18.64 0.23 1.01 
product 3 21.00 16.12 -4.88 0.77 21.95 19.15 -2.80 0.87 
product 4 10.98 8.41 -2.57 0.77 9.88 7.52 -2.36 0.76 
product 5 8.39 6.03 -2.36 0.72 7.43 5.28 -2.15 0.71 
product 6 17.62 15.86 -1.76 0.90 16.66 16.03 -0.63 0.96 
product 7 21.03 15.68 -5.35 0.75 20.30 16.91 -3.39 0.83 
product 8 — — — — 4.12 5.68 1.56 1.38 
product 9 — — — — 3.54 4.42 0.88 1.25 
product 10 — — — — 7.82 12.01 4.20 1.54 
product 11 — — — — 9.38 11.72 2.34 1.25 





Table 2.13: Expected consumer surplus  (CS) before and after the entry of SB’s  
  Before After change % change 
Avg expected CS per unit demand (¢) 1.1 1.21 0.12 10.48 
Avg expected CS per market ($) 569.85 625.51 55.66 9.77 
Note: 1. “change” is calculated by (After-Before). 2. “% change” is calculated by (change/Before*100). 
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Table 3.1: Shares of different package sizes  
package size market share purchase occasion share feature/display share 
3.25 oz 0.22% 0.18% 0.13% 
6.5 oz 89.58% 91.40% 99.48% 
9.25 oz 4.45% 3.82% 0.39% 
12.5 oz 4.20% 2.97% 0.00% 
3-pack-3.25 oz 1.55% 1.63% 0.00% 
total 100% 100% 100% 
Note: 1. “market share” is the quantity (measured by oz) sold of a particular package size over the total quantity sold of 
the whole product category. 2. “purchase occasion share” is the number of purchase occasions of a particular package 
size over the total number of purchase occasions. 3. “feature/display share” is the number of weeks of a particular 






Table 3.2: Shares and prices of the dominant brands     
brand market share  purchase occasion share feature/display share avg shelf price 
1: StarKist 42.17% 45.28% 56.94% 0.72 
2: CKN 26.42% 26.19% 26.66% 0.78 
3: 3 Diamond 2.18% 2.75% 6.39% 0.75 
4: PL 8.37% 7.37% 5.96% 0.67 
total 79.15% 81.59% 95.95%  





Table 3.3: Aggregate demand with respect to retail price discount 
  # obs  # qty avg % obs  % qty 
Discount < 10%  6715 431060 64.19 71.38 20.02 
10% <= discount < 20% 414 42069 101.62 4.40 1.95 
20% <= discount < 30% 832 361891 434.97 8.84 16.81 
30% <= discount < 40% 541 398688 736.95 5.75 18.52 
40% <= discount < 50% 289 446642 1545.47 3.07 20.75 
50% <= discount < 60% 323 294406 911.47 3.43 13.68 
Discount >= 60% 293 177908 607.19 3.11 8.26 
total 9407 2152664 228.84 100.00 100.00 
Note: 1. Each observation is a brand-store-week combination. 2. Quantity is measured by cans. 3. “discount” = 
%.
regular






Table 3.4: Distributions of households’ sale and non-sale purchase quantities 
distribution of sale purchase quantity distribution of non-sale purchase quantity 
 # purchase % cum %   # purchase % cum %  
1 can 2869 28.60 28.60 1 can 1341 52.63 52.63 
2 cans 5365 53.48 82.09 2 cans 978 38.38 91.01 
3 cans 1008 10.05 92.13 3 cans 133 5.22 96.23 
4 cans 571 5.69 97.83 4 cans 73 2.86 99.10 
5 cans 53 0.53 98.36 5 cans 5 0.20 99.29 
6 cans 101 1.01 99.36 6 cans 11 0.43 99.73 
more 64 0.64 100.00 more 7 0.27 100.00 
total 10031 100.00  total 2548 100.00  
 
  sale non-sale total 
# purchase 10031 2548 12579 





Table 3.5: Distributions of households’ purchase frequencies and quantities 
# purchases # hh % cum %  # quantities # purchases % cum %  
1 purchase 14 0.79 0.79 1 can 4210 33.47 33.47 
2 purchases 313 17.57 18.36 2 cans 6343 50.43 83.89 
3 purchases 252 14.15 32.51 3 cans 1141 9.07 92.96 
4 purchases 193 10.84 43.35 4 cans 644 5.12 98.08 
5 purchases 162 9.10 52.44 5 cans 58 0.46 98.55 
6 purchases 137 7.69 60.13 6 cans 112 0.89 99.44 
7 purchases 99 5.56 65.69 7 cams  14 0.11 99.55 
8 purchases 100 5.61 71.31 8 cans 28 0.22 99.77 
9 purchases 81 4.55 75.86 9 cans 2 0.02 99.79 
10 purchases 67 3.76 79.62 10 cans 16 0.13 99.91 
11 purchases 54 3.03 82.65 11 cans 1 0.01 99.92 
12 purchases 41 2.30 84.95 12 cans 3 0.02 99.94 
13 purchases 42 2.36 87.31 more 7 0.06 100.00 
14 purchases 25 1.40 88.71 total 12579 100.00  
15 purchases 37 2.08 90.79     
16 purchases 28 1.57 92.36     
17 purchases 24 1.35 93.71     
18 purchases 23 1.29 95.00     
19 purchases 18 1.01 96.01     
20 purchases 15 0.84 96.86     
more 56 3.14 100.00     
total 1781 100.00      
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Table 3.6: Sale-purchase ratio, purchase duration, and purchase quantity for 
households with the same purchase frequency 
purchase frequency # hh % hh Ratio Duration Quantity 
2 purchases 313 17.71% 0.81 16.44 2.05 
3 purchases 252 14.26% 0.78 14.55 2.03 
4 purchases 193 10.92% 0.77 12.44 2.00 
5 purchases 162 9.17% 0.81 11.24 2.09 
6 purchases 137 7.75% 0.81 10.20 1.92 
7 purchases 99 5.60% 0.77 9.40 1.87 
8 purchases 100 5.66% 0.79 8.62 1.88 
9 purchases 81 4.58% 0.84 8.52 2.02 
10 purchases 67 3.79% 0.81 8.36 1.93 
11 purchases 54 3.06% 0.80 7.73 1.92 
12 purchases 41 2.32% 0.76 7.39 1.86 
13 purchases 42 2.38% 0.85 7.27 1.93 
14 purchases 25 1.41% 0.84 6.80 2.31 
15 purchases 37 2.09% 0.84 6.59 1.98 
>= 16 purchases 164 9.28% 0.79 5.23 1.91 
total 1767 100.00% 0.80 11.19 1.99 
Note: 1. “Ratio” is defined as the number of sale purchases to the number of total purchases for a household. 2.  








Table 3.7: Durations to the next purchase and from the previous purchase 
 for sale and non-sale purchases 
 household sample sale next  
non-sale 




previous  diff  
>= 2 purchases 8.57 7.02 1.55 8.53 7.10 1.43 
>= 3 purchases 8.33 6.74 1.59 8.28 6.89 1.39 
>= 4 purchases 8.03 6.28 1.75 7.95 6.54 1.41 
>= 5 purchases 7.72 6.05 1.67 7.65 6.25 1.40 
>= 6 purchases 7.44 5.74 1.70 7.36 6.00 1.35 
>= 7 purchases 7.16 5.54 1.62 7.05 5.90 1.15 
>= 8 purchases 6.96 5.31 1.64 6.85 5.67 1.19 
>= 9 purchases 6.72 5.22 1.50 6.63 5.53 1.10 
>= 10 purchases 6.49 5.06 1.43 6.40 5.35 1.06 
>= 11 purchases 6.24 4.87 1.37 6.15 5.19 0.95 
>= 12 purchases 6.03 4.74 1.29 5.95 5.02 0.93 
>= 13 purchases 5.87 4.54 1.33 5.82 4.73 1.09 
>= 14 purchases 5.65 4.41 1.24 5.61 4.54 1.07 
>= 15 purchases 5.54 4.25 1.29 5.49 4.44 1.04 
>= 16 purchases 5.32 4.11 1.21 5.26 4.32 0.93 
>= 17 purchases 5.19 4.00 1.18 5.12 4.21 0.90 
>= 18 purchases 5.07 3.78 1.30 4.99 4.02 0.97 
within sale-nonsale difference average # hh 
duration to next purchase 1.2200 711 
duration from previous purchase 0.8292 676 
Note: “diff” is sale next (previous) minus non-sale next (previous). 
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Table 3.8: Conditional probability that the previous purchase is non-sale  
household sample 






% (NS(t-1) | 
S(t)) 






% (NS(t-1) | 
NS(t)) 
>= 2 purchases 7495 1157 13.37 1049 1097 51.12 
>= 3 purchases 7274 1118 13.32 1022 1071 51.17 
>= 4 purchases 6947 1047 13.10 957 1030 51.84 
>= 5 purchases 6564 981 13.00 899 958 51.59 
>= 6 purchases 6116 905 12.89 833 900 51.93 
>= 7 purchases 5625 831 12.87 772 841 52.14 
>= 8 purchases 5231 765 12.76 715 764 51.66 
>= 9 purchases 4751 690 12.68 648 686 51.42 
>= 10 purchases 4272 622 12.71 583 650 52.72 
>= 11 purchases 3849 553 12.56 519 603 53.74 
>= 12 purchases 3471 495 12.48 470 548 53.83 
>= 13 purchases 3177 442 12.21 420 494 54.05 
>= 14 purchases 2794 397 12.44 381 457 54.53 
>= 15 purchases 2544 375 12.85 361 424 54.01 
>= 16 purchases 2156 328 13.20 319 383 54.56 
>= 17 purchases 1830 294 13.84 288 354 55.14 
>= 18 purchases 1534 260 14.49 255 333 56.63 
 within sale-nonsale difference avg # hh 
cond. prob. of a previous non-sale purchase 8.45% 676 
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Table 3.9: Duration effects during the  sale and non-sale periods  
log(qty) Coef. Std. t test log(qty) Coef. Std. t test 
log(price) -3.158 0.043 -73.730 log(price) -2.832 0.048 -59.250 
feature 0.045 0.032 1.430 feature 0.043 0.031 1.380 
display 0.025 0.044 0.560 display 0.016 0.044 0.360 
lent 0.004 0.024 0.170 lent 0.012 0.024 0.500 
constant 2.787 0.057 49.010 constant 2.916 0.057 51.260 
duration 0.004 0.003 1.400 duration-sale 0.139 0.010 14.530 
        duration-nonsale -0.003 0.003 -1.200 
# of obs  9225   # of obs  9225    
Adj R2 0.714     Adj R2 0.739     
Note: 1.Each observation is a brand-week-store combination. 2. The covariate “duration” is the number of weeks since 
last sale of any brand in the same store. 3. The covariate “duration-sale” is zero when the brand is not on sale and 
equals “duration” when it is on sale that week; similarly, the covariate “duration-nonsale” is zero when the brand is on 
sale and equals “duration” when it is not on sale that week. 4. Store- and brand-specific dummy variables are included 






Table 3.10: Frequencies of at least one brand on sale  
  sale 
Chain 1 42.28% 
Chain 2 54.59% 
Chain 3 47.80% 
Chain 4 98.17% 




Table 3.11: Durations to the next purchase and from the previous purchase 
 for sale and non-sale purchases on a chain basis 
 
  duration to next purchase duration from previous pruchase 
  sale  non-sale diff sale  non-sale diff 
chain 1 7.85 6.05 1.80 7.57 6.44 1.14 
chain 2 7.68 6.29 1.39 7.96 5.47 2.49 
chain 3 7.35 6.37 0.98 7.40 6.04 1.36 
chain 4 7.21 6.11 1.10 7.08 7.44 -0.36 





Table 3.12: Conditional probability that the previous purchase is non-sale  
on a chain basis 
 
 # s(t) # (ns(t-1) | 
s(t)) 
%  (ns(t-1) | 
s(t)) 
# ns(t) # (ns(t-1) | 
ns(t)) 
%  (ns(t-1) | 
ns(t)) 
chain 1 1001 258 25.8% 648 404 62.3%
chain 2 1178 229 19.4% 495 315 63.6%
chain 3 1428 153 10.7% 240 99 41.3%




Table 3.13: Duration effects during the sale and non-sale periods  
on a chain basis 
 
chain 1       
log(qty) Coef. Std. t test 
log(price) -3.437 0.084 -40.99 
duration-sale 0.047 0.009 5.33 
duration-nonsale 0.001 0.002 0.34 
# of obs  3956    
Adj R2 0.790     
chain 2       
log(qty) Coef. Std. t test 
log(price) -3.577 0.128 -27.87 
duration-sale 0.251 0.026 9.58 
duration-nonsale 0.083 0.012 7.1 
# of obs  1711    
Adj R2 0.785     
chain 3       
log(qty) Coef. Std. t test 
log(price) -1.848 0.085 -21.63 
duration-sale 0.508 0.042 12.21 
duration-nonsale -0.052 0.025 -2.06 
# of obs  2365    
Adj R2 0.685     
chain 4       
log(qty) Coef. Std. t test 
log(price) -5.420 0.273 -19.85 
duration-sale 0.300 0.176 1.71 
duration-nonsale 0.095 0.156 0.61 
# of obs  1193    
Adj R2 0.741     
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Table 3.14: Estimation results for the proportional hazard model 
 household sample sale(t) feature(t) display(t) sale(t-1) hhsize log(hhinc) 
>= 2 purchases -0.133 0.021 0.057 -0.172 0.068 0.033 
>= 3 purchases -0.130 0.013 0.054 -0.178 0.066 0.030 
>= 4 purchases -0.126 0.015 0.049 -0.207 0.061 0.028 
>= 5 purchases -0.137 0.019 0.060 -0.203 0.063 0.023 
>= 6 purchases -0.134 0.013 0.056 -0.223 0.070 0.005 
>= 7 purchases -0.113 0.006 0.087 -0.236 0.069 -0.014 
>= 8 purchases -0.121 0.000 0.060 -0.244 0.060 -0.003 
>= 9 purchases -0.124 0.007 0.065 -0.237 0.053 -0.003 
>= 10 purchases -0.126 0.018 0.074 -0.240 0.054 0.000 
>= 11 purchases -0.121 0.029 0.058 -0.241 0.046 -0.022 
>= 12 purchases -0.114 0.018 0.043 -0.240 0.049 -0.034 
>= 13 purchases -0.136 0.011 0.021 -0.250 0.040 -0.032 
>= 14 purchases -0.144 0.007 -0.010 -0.240 0.037 -0.045 
>= 15 purchases -0.136 0.013 -0.011 -0.266 0.034 -0.048 
>= 16 purchases -0.112 -0.003 -0.021 -0.264 0.030 -0.039 
t test sale(t) feature(t) display(t) sale(t-1) hhsize log(hhinc) 
>= 2 purchases -5.443 1.084 2.180 -7.649 9.804 2.327 
>= 3 purchases -5.209 0.650 2.051 -7.793 9.435 2.048 
>= 4 purchases -4.829 0.734 1.815 -8.660 8.449 1.839 
>= 5 purchases -5.053 0.896 2.124 -8.266 8.589 1.490 
>= 6 purchases -4.797 0.592 1.948 -8.800 8.580 0.329 
>= 7 purchases -3.927 0.260 2.820 -8.914 8.157 -0.825 
>= 8 purchases -4.044 0.010 1.879 -8.690 6.761 -0.195 
>= 9 purchases -3.993 0.289 1.919 -8.067 5.592 -0.169 
>= 10 purchases -3.839 0.689 2.072 -7.715 5.237 0.022 
>= 11 purchases -3.448 1.036 1.533 -7.343 4.199 -1.003 
>= 12 purchases -3.097 0.595 1.079 -6.845 4.220 -1.412 
>= 13 purchases -3.474 0.364 0.511 -6.782 3.198 -1.245 
>= 14 purchases -3.466 0.224 -0.234 -6.214 2.826 -1.704 
>= 15 purchases -3.174 0.381 -0.240 -6.681 2.476 -1.828 
>= 16 purchases -2.468 -0.075 -0.434 -6.303 2.121 -1.376 
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purchase  sale qty 
non-sale 
qty diff 
>= 2 purchases 1767 8544 2254 79.13 20.87 2.02 1.63 0.40 
>= 3 purchases 1454 8296 2189 79.12 20.88 2.02 1.63 0.40 
>= 4 purchases 1202 7904 2077 79.19 20.81 2.02 1.62 0.39 
>= 5 purchases 1009 7463 1939 79.38 20.62 2.01 1.62 0.40 
>= 6 purchases 847 6949 1805 79.38 20.62 2.00 1.62 0.38 
>= 7 purchases 710 6397 1672 79.28 20.72 2.00 1.62 0.38 
>= 8 purchases 611 5946 1529 79.55 20.45 2.00 1.63 0.38 
>= 9 purchases 511 5399 1376 79.69 20.31 2.01 1.64 0.37 
>= 10 purchases 430 4855 1272 79.24 20.76 2.00 1.65 0.34 
>= 11 purchases 363 4368 1156 79.07 20.93 1.99 1.65 0.34 
>= 12 purchases 309 3941 1043 79.07 20.93 2.00 1.64 0.36 
>= 13 purchases 268 3597 936 79.35 20.65 2.01 1.65 0.36 
>= 14 purchases 226 3175 854 78.80 21.20 2.01 1.65 0.37 
>= 15 purchases 201 2905 799 78.43 21.57 1.99 1.56 0.43 
>= 16 purchases 164 2475 711 77.68 22.32 1.99 1.54 0.44 
>= 17 purchases 136 2118 648 76.57 23.43 1.95 1.54 0.41 
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Figure 1.7: Utility from the outside good w.r.t. the  elapsed time since last purchase 

























Figure 1.8: Logarithm of simulated category demand  



















Figure 1.9: Price patterns of StarKist and CKN in Dominick’s store #59 

































Figure 1.10: Price patterns of StarKist and CKN in Dominick’s store #100  
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